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This Article examines past and present systems requiring that a person re-
ceive permission before buying or borrowing a firearm. The Article covers such
laws from the eighteenth century to the present, which have traditionally been
rare in the United States. The major exceptions are antebellum laws of the slave
states, and laws of those same states immediately after the Civil War that for-
bade gun ownership by people of color, unless the individual had been granted
government permission. Today “universal background checks” are based on a
system created by former New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg and his
“Everytown” lobby. Such laws have been enacted in several states and proposed
as federal legislation. Besides covering the private sale of firearms, they also
cover most loans of firearms and the return of loaned firearms. By requiring that
almost all loans and returns be processed by a gun store, these laws danger-
ously constrict responsible firearms activities, such as safety training and safe
storage. Massachusetts, Connecticut, and California are among the jurisdictions
that have enacted less restrictive legislation creating controls on private fire-
arms sales without inflicting so much harm on firearms safety.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Congress and in the states, “universal background checks” have be-
come an important topic in the firearms policy debate. Legislation on the
subject is the creation of former New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg,
whose lobby is called Everytown for Gun Safety in America (“Ever-
ytown”).1 The Bloomberg laws forbid most private sales of firearms, private
loans, and the return of loaned firearms, unless the transaction is processed
at a gun store, following the same procedure as if the gun store were selling
a firearm from its inventory. In Congress, the Bloomberg legislation has
been sponsored by Senator Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.). He calls his bill “the
gold standard” for background checks.2 Laws based on the Bloomberg fed-
eral model have been enacted in Delaware,3 Colorado,4 Washington,5 and
1 Previously, Mr. Bloomberg’s lobby was called “Mayors Against Illegal Guns.” See
Michael Bloomberg, Mayors Against Illegal Guns To Launch Gun-Control Ad Blitz, HUF-
FINGTON POST (Mar. 23, 2013, 9:10 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/23/bloom-
berg-gun-ads_n_2941612.html [http://perma.cc/95CE-CHAN].
2 113 CONG. REC. S2736 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 2013) (statement of Sen. Schumer).
3
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1448B (2015).
4 H.B. 13–1229, 69th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2013) (codified at COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-12-112 (2013)).
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Oregon,6 and will be on the ballot in Nevada in 2016.7 This Article concen-
trates on the federal Schumer bill as the national model, while also discuss-
ing its state analogues.
The Bloomberg laws are highly destructive of Second Amendment
rights. Their effect is to criminalize many ordinary and responsible activities,
such as firearms safety training, museum displays of historic arms, and safe
storage. Mr. Bloomberg’s Everytown organization argues that the laws are
constitutional, because they are of the type that the Supreme Court, in Dis-
trict of Columbia v. Heller, called “presumptively lawful” and “longstand-
ing.”8 However, examination of gun control laws from early American
history through the first third of the twentieth century shows that the Bloom-
berg laws are outliers in the history of American gun control.
This Article takes no position for or against new laws about the private
sale of firearms, as a constitutional or policy matter. Rather, the Article de-
tails how the Bloomberg system’s stringent restrictions on firearms loans and
returns seriously harm public safety. Further, Bloomberg’s requirement that
private sales may only be consummated at gun stores is needlessly burden-
some and seriously undermines the purported objective of increasing back-
ground checks on private sales.
There are much better alternatives to the Bloomberg system of requir-
ing that private transactions must always use gun stores as intermediaries. In
particular, background checks on private sales can be accomplished by al-
lowing the buyer and seller to conduct the check through contact with the
appropriate state or federal agency via Internet or telephone. Nor is there a
need to force people to travel to gun stores for background checks when they
have already passed a more stringent check: the check for the issuance of a
handgun carry permit (and the continuous checks undertaken to ensure the
permit’s validity).
This Article proceeds as follows:
Part II describes the Bloomberg laws.
Part III details the ways in which the Bloomberg system criminalizes
the activities of the large majority of firearms owners, including those who
have never sold a firearm to anyone. Firearms safety instruction, museum
displays of firearms, and many other constructive activities are severely im-
paired or made impossible.
5 Wash., Initiative No. 594 to Require Background Checks for Gun Sales and Transfers
(June 17, 2013) [hereinafter Wash. I-594], http://sos.wa.gov/_assets/elections/initiatives/
FinalText_483.pdf [http://perma.cc/F29G-J2DB] (codified primarily at WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9.41.010 (2015)).
6 S.B. 941, 78th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2015), https://olis.leg.state.or.us/liz/
2015R1/Downloads/MeasureDocument/SB941/Enrolled [http://perma.cc/7L8E-BVVS].
7 Nev. Initiative Petition to Enact The Background Check Act (August 11, 2014), http://
nvsos.gov/Modules/ShowDocument.aspx?documentid=3440 [http://perma.cc/3DDU-BPEC].
8 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008).
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Parts IV–VI address the issue of whether the Bloomberg laws qualify as
“presumptively constitutional” and “longstanding.” Part IV synthesizes the
lower court decisions that have analyzed whether a particular type of gun
control is “longstanding.”
Part V examines the Bloomberg laws in light of their analogues—gun
licensing laws for slaves and for free people of color—from the colonial
period through the nineteenth century. Before 1900, there was no tradition of
gun licensing laws being applied to citizens who were recognized as having
the full scope of constitutional rights.
Part VI surveys state laws from the early twentieth century through
1936. Although 1936 is beyond the temporal limits of what lower courts
have treated as “longstanding,” this Article goes up to 1936, erring on the
side of over-inclusion. Even when one takes into account everything through
1936, the Bloomberg laws have very few analogues. This deficiency does
not mean that the Bloomberg laws are automatically unconstitutional; it sim-
ply means that the Bloomberg laws do not qualify for the “longstanding”
safe harbor. Rather, the government bears the burden of proving them con-
stitutional, under the ordinary procedures of heightened scrutiny.
Part VII examines alternatives to the Bloomberg model. These alterna-
tives would be more effective at achieving the objectives of background
checks on the private sale of firearms, without creating the unnecessary
problems that result from the Bloomberg system.
Part VIII concludes.
II. THE BLOOMBERG LAWS
A. Background on Federal Laws Regarding Arms Sales
In 1968, Congress enacted the Gun Control Act of 1968 (“GCA”)
based on its power to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.”9
The GCA requires that every person who is “engaged in the business” of
selling firearms must obtain a Federal Firearms License (“FFL”).10 Thus,
FFLs are necessary for retailers, wholesalers, and manufacturers of firearms.
Only persons with an FFL may engage in interstate commerce in firearms,
9
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
10 A person is “engaged in the business” of selling firearms if he is:
a person who devotes time, attention, and labor to dealing in firearms as a regular
course of trade or business with the principal objective of livelihood and profit
through the repetitive purchase and resale of firearms, but such term shall not in-
clude a person who makes occasional sales, exchanges, or purchases of firearms for
the enhancement of a personal collection or for a hobby, or who sells all or part of
his personal collection of firearms.
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(21)(D) (2012). A person who is “engaged in the business,” but who does
not have an FFL, is guilty of a federal felony every time he sells a firearm.
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such as buying firearms from wholesalers for the purpose of selling them to
retail customers.
Under the GCA, when a firearms retailer sells a firearm to a customer,
the customer must fill out ATF Form 4473. Created by the federal Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives (“ATF”), Form 4473 has three
dozen fields that must be completed by the customer and the retailer.11
Under federal law, there are nine categories of “prohibited persons” who
may not purchase or possess firearms.12 These include convicted felons, ille-
gal aliens, domestic violence misdemeanants, and persons who have re-
nounced U.S. citizenship.13 The buyer must indicate on the 4473 whether she
falls within any of those categories.14 A false answer to these questions is a
federal felony.15 Many people have been prosecuted for falsifying a 4473.16
The retailer must retain the 4473 Form.17 In addition, the retailer must
separately record in his “Acquisition and Disposition” record book every
firearm that comes into his inventory, as well as the sale of any firearm from
his inventory.18
The GCA forbids anyone who is not an FFL19 from purchasing hand-
guns outside her state of residence.20 Interstate purchase of long guns is al-
lowed; the seller must be an FFL (not a private person), and the purchase
must be legal in the FFL’s state and in the buyer’s state.21
11 27 C.F.R. § 478.124 (2010); see also BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS &
EXPLOSIVES, OMB NO. 1140-0020, ATF FORM 4473: FIREARMS TRANSACTION RECORD PART
I—OVER-THE-COUNTER (2012) [hereinafter ATF Form 4473], https://www.pdffiller.com/en/
project/38073119.htm?form_id=1535 [http://perma.cc/8327-TCUT]. Among the mandatory
data collected by the form are the race and ethnicity of the customer, although neither piece of
information has anything to do with the customer’s legal eligibility to purchase a firearm. ATF
Form 4473, Question 10. Representatives Diane Black (R-Tenn.) and Ted Poe (R-Tex.) have
introduced House Amendment 325, an appropriations rider to prohibit spending federal funds
to mandate race or ethnicity disclosure by firearms purchasers. They argue that collecting the
information is racist. See Tim Devaney, Republicans Assail Race Disclosures in Gun
Purchases, THE HILL (Apr. 19, 2015), http://thehill.com/regulation/239306-republicans-assail-
race-disclosures-in-gun-purchases [http://perma.cc/CT6Q-BGR9].
12 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012).
13 Id.
14 See ATF Form 4473, supra note 11. R
15 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(6), 924(a)(2) (2012).
16 See, e.g., TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, SYRACUSE UNIV., ALL
AGENCIES CURRENT FY: PROSECUTIONS (2015), http://trac.syr.edu/laws/18/18USC00924.html
[http://perma.cc/FZN4-KHR6]. As of Sept. 29, 2015, there had been 526 prosecutions in fis-
cal year 2015 for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 924, which prohibits, inter alia, the falsification of
Form 4473.
17 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(1)(A) (2012).
18 27 C.F.R. § 478.125(e) (2010).
19 Throughout this Article, “FFL” will be used to refer to both the actual licenses and the
individuals who possess them.
20 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(3) (2012). The prohibition was ruled unconstitutional in Mance v.
Holder, 74 F. Supp. 3d 795 (N.D. Tex. 2015), appeal docketed No.15-10211 (5th Cir. Apr. 14,
2015).
21 The 1968 GCA had originally allowed interstate long gun purchases only between con-
tiguous states. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 902, 82 Stat. 197, 228 (1968), amended by Pub. L. 90-
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Under the GCA, private sales may only take place between residents of
the same state. “Private sales” are sales not involving an FFL—as when a
person sells a rifle to a fellow member of his gun club.
The congressional regulation of firearms retailers via the interstate
commerce power has a fairly close connection to interstate commerce: every
firearms retailer receives firearms in interstate commerce. There are no gun
stores that sell only firearms manufactured in-state. Appropriately, Congress
did not extend the 1968 system to private sales within a single state. The
decision made sense because the interstate commerce power is finite.22 Pur-
suant to the GCA, a lawful private sale is by definition not “among the
several States.” Although the firearm at one time may have been shipped in
interstate commerce (e.g., from a Massachusetts manufacturer to a Tennes-
see wholesaler to a Utah retailer), the firearm likely remained in a single
state for years or decades after the initial retail sale.23
The 1968 GCA system for retail sales had a practical problem: although
it facilitated prosecutions of people who falsified Form 4473, the retailer had
no ability to know whether the customer’s answers on the form were truthful.
Thus, if a prohibited person was willing to take the risk of a perjury prosecu-
tion, the GCA system would not prevent him from purchasing a gun in a
store.
The GCA did not preempt state laws,24 and some states had (or later
created) mechanisms that attempted to prevent ineligible buyers from acquir-
ing guns in the first place. Typically, the mechanisms only applied to hand-
guns (which are disproportionately used in gun crimes),25 but in a few states
they also applied to long guns. Some states had a “waiting period,” by
which a sale could not proceed until after a certain number of days.26 In the
618, § 102, 82 Stat. 1213, 1216 (1968). That restriction was removed in 1986. Pub. L. 99-308,
§ 102, 100 Stat. 449, 451 (1986).
22 See David B. Kopel & Glenn H. Reynolds, Taking Federalism Seriously: Lopez and the
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban, 30 CONN. L. REV. 59, 68 (1997).
23 Professor David Engdahl derides “the herpes theory” of interstate commerce, that once
an item has traveled in interstate commerce, it forever after retains an “interstate” character
that subjects it to congressional control. See David E. Engdahl, The Necessary and Proper
Clause as an Intrinsic Restraint on Federal Lawmaking Power, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
107, 120 (1998); David E. Engdahl, Review, Casebooks and Constitutional Competency, 21
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 741, 784 (1998).
24 18 U.S.C. § 927 (2012).
25 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 695–98 (2008) (Breyer, J., dis-
senting) (citing numerous studies and reports).
26 Five states currently have waiting periods for all guns, and five others have waiting
periods for handguns. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 26815(a), 26950–27140, 27540(a),
27600–27750 (all guns, ten days); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4508 (all guns, ten days); FLA.
CONST. art. VIII, § 5(b); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.0655(1) (handguns, three business days);
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134-2(e) (all guns, fourteen days; but no wait for a long gun pur-
chased within a year of a long gun purchase that had the wait); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-
3(A)(g) (seventy-two hours for handguns and twenty-four for long guns); IOWA CODE § 724.20
(handguns, three days); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY §§ 5-123–5-125 (handguns, seven
days); MINN. STAT. § 624.7132, subds. 4, 12 (seven days for handguns and “assault weap-
ons”); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:58-2a(5)(a), 2C:58-3f (handguns, seven days); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 11-47-35(a)(1), 11-47-35.1, 11-47-35.2 (seven days).
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interim, the retailer would notify local law enforcement, which could veto
the sale. Some other states required persons to first obtain a license before
buying guns.27 A few required an advance purchase permit for every
handgun.28
These alternative systems were also flawed. As of 1968, and for years
afterward, the main source of information available to local law enforcement
was the FBI’s fingerprint-based Interstate Identification Index.29 The Index
generally recorded arrests, and frequently omitted dispositions. Because con-
victions, not arrests, are what matter in determining whether someone is a
prohibited person, law enforcement often could not know for certain whether
a person was prohibited merely by looking at the Index. If law enforcement
ordered a retailer not to proceed with a sale, based only on an arrest, then the
rights of a law-abiding citizen were violated. Some licensing or permit-to-
purchase systems were operated fairly, but others were not, with police
chiefs refusing to issue permits to applicants who met all the legal requi-
sites.30 Waiting periods could be very inconvenient for people who did not
live near a gun store, and they could be fatal for persons who needed a
firearm for immediate self-defense. For example, because of Wisconsin’s
forty-eight-hour waiting period, Bonnie Elmasri was killed by her stalker
before she could take possession of the handgun she was attempting to
purchase.31
27 For example, starting in 1967, Illinois began requiring that would-be gun owners must
first obtain a Firearms Owner’s Identification card. Act of Aug. 3, 1967, 1967 Ill. Laws 2600.
28 E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-3 (2015).
29 See Five Key Services, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/
cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/iafis/ngi_services [https://perma.cc/34K4-Z543].
30 For example, New York’s handgun law has no requirement that an applicant prove a
“need” for a handgun. Yet the New York City Police Department imposed such a requirement,
and kept enforcing it notwithstanding repeated court orders. See generally Livingston v. Codd,
403 N.Y.S.2d 662 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (overturning police refusal to issue pistol purchase
permit to gun collector to purchase “curios and relics” because applicant had made “no show-
ing of need”); Archibald v. Codd, 395 N.Y.S.2d 336 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) (overturning police
refusal to allow a person to purchase a second handgun because of “insufficient need”); Turner
v. Codd, 378 N.Y.S.2d 888 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975) (enjoining NYC police policy of refusing to
issue pistol permits if the police decided that a qualified applicant did not “need” a pistol);
Klapper v. Codd, 356 N.Y.S.2d 431 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974) (overturning police refusal to issue
handgun permit because applicant “had a number of jobs in the last several years”). Cf.
Savitch v. Lange, 493 N.Y.S.2d 889 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (overturning refusal to issue per-
mit because police commissioner had, without providing any reason, recommended denial);
Charbonneau v. Brown, 415 N.Y.S.2d 126 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (overturning Saratoga
County revocation of handgun licensee because licensee had displayed his handgun when
someone ran him off the road and attempted to rob him); Hochreich v. Codd, 417 N.Y.S.2d
498 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (overturning police refusal to issue a permit for applicant to
purchase a handgun for hunting, unless applicant disposed of one of his three other handguns).
Similar abuses took place in St. Louis, when Missouri had a permit-to-purchase law for hand-
guns. See infra Part VI.A.
31 See DAVID B. KOPEL, Waiting Periods, in GUNS: WHO SHOULD HAVE THEM? 61, 61–62
(David B. Kopel ed., 1995). The Wisconsin waiting period was repealed in 2015. S.B. 35,
2015–16 Leg. Sess. (Wis. 2015), https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2015/related/acts/22 [https://
perma.cc/M72P-VP5U].
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In 1993, Congress attempted to improve the system. Form 4473 was
retained, but firearms retailers would also have a new requirement: before
proceeding with the sale, the retailer would have to contact the FBI or a state
counterpart for an “instant check.”32 The National Instant Criminal Back-
ground Check System (“NICS”) went into effect in 1998;33 initially, checks
were conducted by telephone,34 but today they are often conducted via the
Internet.35 By default, the FBI handles all checks, but states can choose to
instead establish a state “Point of Contact.”36 Seven states use the FBI only
for long guns, and use the state Point of Contact for handguns.37 Because
much-improved computer databases now exist, the FBI or its state counter-
part can usually issue within a few minutes the instruction that the retailer
proceed or not proceed with the sale.38 To protect customer privacy, the re-
tailer is not informed about the reason for an instruction not to proceed.39 If
the sale is denied, the would-be buyer is given some papers with instructions
about how to appeal.40
The availability of NICS has led some states to repeal waiting periods,
licensing, and permitting laws for firearms purchases.41 These old-fashioned
means of conducting a check now seem unnecessarily cumbersome, given
that a superior, comprehensive check is available at the point of purchase.
32 18 U.S.C. § 922(t); Pub. L. 103-59, Title I, § 102(a)(1), (b), Title III, § 302(a)–(c) (Nov.
30, 1993), 107 Stat. 1536, 1539, 1545.
33 NICS Turns 15, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Nov. 29, 2013), https://www.fbi.gov/
news/stories/2013/november/nics-15th-anniversary-stats-show-success-of-gun-background-
check-system [https://perma.cc/78X9-R3ES] (“Fifteen years ago, on November 30, 1998, the
FBI flipped the switch on the National Instant Criminal Background Check System . . . .”).
34
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. SERVS. DIV., NATIONAL IN-
STANT CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECK SYSTEM (NICS) OPERATIONS REPORT (NOVEMBER 30,
1998–DECEMBER 31, 1999) 5 (Mar. 1, 2000), https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/nics/reports/
98-99-operations-report/ops_report_98_99.pdf [https://perma.cc/8NRZ-285J] (“[T]he FFL
contacts the NICS at the FBI, via a toll free telephone number.”).
35
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. SERVS. DIV., NATIONAL IN-
STANT CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECK SYSTEM (NICS) OPERATIONS 2014, at 13 (2014),
https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/nics/reports/2014-operations-report [https://perma.cc/
LWU8-X5HT] (detailing growth of NICS E-Check: 3,772,583 firearms E-Checks in 2014).
36 Participation Map, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/
nics/general-information/participation-map [https://perma.cc/L9MN-7RG5] (relaying that
thirty-six states and territories use the FBI for all checks; thirteen states run all checks
themselves).
37 Id.
38 In 2014, the FBI’s “Immediate Determination Rate” was ninety-one percent. NATIONAL
INSTANT CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECK SYSTEM (NICS) OPERATIONS 2014, supra note 35, at R
10.
39 NICS Guide for Appealing a Firearm Transfer, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Sept.
2013), https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/nics/appeals/nics-guide-for-appealing [https://perma
.cc/D3HX-L923] (“You may request the reason for your denial or delay from the FBI in
writing by mail, facsimile, or on-line. Due to the Privacy Act of 1974, the reason for the denial
or delay cannot be disseminated to you via the telephone.”).
40 For the brochure used in states where the FBI conducts all the checks, see id.
41 E.g., An Act of July 19, 1995, Ch. 729, § 1, 1995, Or. Laws 2222; S.B. 35, 2015–16
Leg. Sess. (Wis. 2015); 2009 S.D. ALS 122.
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NICS is not perfect. Although the check itself is rapid, the federal or
state systems sometimes take hours or days before they even begin process-
ing a check; this is particularly true at times when gun sales volume is large
(e.g., on weekends, shortly before hunting season, or when anti-gun propos-
als are in the news).42 Some purchases are denied because of mistaken iden-
tity, while other times a denial is based on an arrest, rather than conviction.
In Colorado, over half of denials are appealed, and over half of appeals are
successful.43
Finally, the NICS check has an inherent weakness. The persons who
will submit to a NICS check are those who think that they will pass the
check; they believe that they are lawful gun buyers. NICS will prevent a
purchase by someone who did not realize that her thirty-year-old felony con-
viction for marijuana possession prohibits her from owning a gun for the rest
of her life. Although NICS may deter a person who was recently released
from prison for armed robbery from attempting a retail purchase, retailers
have never been a major source of firearms for such people.44
Under federal law and the laws of most states, the NICS process is
required for retail sales only. Private sales within a single state may simply
take place without paperwork and without contacting the FBI or a state
counterpart. However, federal and state laws criminalize any private sale if
the seller knows or has “reasonable cause to believe” that the buyer is a
prohibited person.45
President Obama is among the many gun control advocates who have
asserted that forty percent of firearms sales have no background check.
However, the study on which this claim is based was conducted before NICS
became operational.46 The Washington Post has given the modern use of this
claim “Three Pinocchios” for being misleading.47
42 See, e.g., Firearm Statistics, COLORADO BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (2013), https://
www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/2013%20Stats.pdf [https://perma.cc/AU79-
RN7V] (noting average queue time of six days, twenty-one hours, fifty-four minutes for In-
ternet requests and forty-five minutes for phone requests in January).
43 Transcript of Record at 1109, Colorado Outfitters Ass’n v. Hickenlooper, 24 F. Supp. 3d
1050 (D. Colo. 2014) (No. 13-1300), http://coloradoguncase.org/trial%20transcripts/ap042014
outfittersctrl5.pdf [http://perma.cc/869E-KMN4] (James Spoden, Colorado Bureau of Investi-
gation, testifying that fifty-four percent of appeals are successful and over fifty percent of
denials are appealed).
44 See, e.g., JAMES D. WRIGHT & PETER ROSSI, ARMED & CONSIDERED DANGEROUS
183–84 (2d ed. 2008) (surveying felons in eleven state prisons).
45 18 U.S.C. § 922(d) (2012).
46
PHILIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, GUNS
IN AMERICA: NATIONAL SURVEY ON PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND USE OF FIREARMS 5–7 (1997),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/165476.pdf [https://perma.cc/G39W-5ZCM] (relying on tele-
phone survey conducted in 1994).
47 Glenn Kessler, Obama’s continued use of the claim that 40 percent of gun sales lack
background checks, WASH. POST (Apr. 2, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-
checker/post/obamas-continued-use-of-the-claim-that-40-percent-of-gun-sales-lack-back-
ground-checks/2013/04/01/002e06ce-9b0f-11e2-a941-a19bce7af755_blog.html [http://perma
.cc/R346-JQFU]. “Three Pinocchios” represent “[s]ignificant factual error and/or obvious
contradictions.” Glenn Kessler, About The Fact Checker, WASH. POST (Sept. 11, 2013), http://
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Surveys of prisoners have long indicated that firearms retailers are a
minor source of criminals’ guns.48 A larger source of guns is personal theft
by criminals themselves.49 But by far the largest source of criminal guns is
purchases from the criminal’s acquaintances.50 As the black market has long
supplied criminals with cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, and other illegal
drugs, it also supplies them with firearms. It is likely that a significant num-
ber of those firearms have previously been stolen by someone else; many
other firearms might have been legally acquired at some point, but their
sellers did not care that they were selling to criminals.
Thus, a system of background checks on private sales would affect pri-
marily law-abiding sellers (who do not wish to sell to a criminal), who are
willing to sell to a stranger (so they do not know if the buyer is a prohibited
person), and who are willing to undergo the process of obtaining a back-
ground check. There is no data about the size of this group, and there is no
evidence that this particular group is a significant source of guns used in
crime. However, this Article will assume that there would be some benefit
from requiring background checks on these sales and that requiring such
checks would not violate the Second Amendment.51 Similarly, this Article
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/about-the-fact-checker/#pinocchio [http://perma
.cc/3WPU-UK8B]. Mr. Bloomberg’s organization also claims that Michigan police records
support the forty percent claim, although the organization has never identified which particular
records contain the supposed data. See Mayors Against Illegal Guns, Felon Seeks Firearm, No
Strings Attached: How Dangerous People Evade Background Checks and Buy Illegal Guns
Online, Everytown for Gun Safety (Sept. 16, 2013), http://everytownresearch.org/reports/
felon-seeks-firearm-no-strings-attached/ [http://perma.cc/TH6B-D29E].
48 See e.g., WRIGHT & ROSSI, supra note 44. R
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 In Printz v. United States, Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion suggested the possibility
that a mandatory check on “purely intrastate sale or possession of firearms, runs afoul of that
Amendment’s protections.” 521 U.S. 898, 938 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring). This view is
supported by the Supreme Court’s opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570,
626–27 (2008). There the Court provided a list of “longstanding” laws that were permissible
gun controls. Id. The inclusion of each exception to the right to keep and bear arms provides
guidance about the scope of the right itself. Id.
Thus, the Court affirmed “prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the
mentally ill.” Id. Felons and the mentally ill are exceptions to the general rule that individual
Americans have a right to possess arms. Id. at 626. The exception only makes sense if the
general rule is valid. After all, if no one has a right to possess arms, then there is no need for a
special rule that felons and the mentally ill may be barred from possessing arms.
The second exception to the right to keep and bear arms is in favor of “laws forbidding the
carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings.” Id. This
exception proves another rule: Americans have a general right to carry firearms. If the Second
Amendment only applied to the keeping of arms at home, and not to the bearing of arms in
public places, then there would be no need to specify the exception for carrying arms in “sen-
sitive places.”
The third Heller exception is for “laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the com-
mercial sale of arms.” Id. at 626–27. The word “commercial” was not inserted purposelessly.
Once again, the exception proves the rule. The Second Amendment allows “conditions and
qualifications” on the commercial sale of arms. The Second Amendment does not allow Con-
gress to impose “conditions and qualifications” on non-commercial transactions.
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will also assume that if congressionally imposed, such checks would be
within Congress’s interstate commerce power.
B. The Bloomberg System for Private Sales, Loans, and Returns
Mr. Bloomberg’s organization promotes its legislation as addressing the
issue of private gun sales that are transacted with no formal background
check.52 Yet the legislation covers far more than gun sales. It applies to every
firearms “transfer.” Normally in firearms law, the word “transfer” has been
interpreted according to dictionary definitions; a “transfer” means a perma-
nent disposition, such as a sale or gift.53 However, the Bloomberg laws con-
tain a special definition, which defines “transfer” to mean every time a
firearm passes from one person to another, even momentarily. For example,
the Washington state law says that “‘Transfer’ means the intended delivery
of a firearm to another person without consideration of payment or promise
of payment including, but not limited to, gifts and loans.”54 In other words, it
applies to sharing a gun while target shooting on one’s own property, or to
lending a gun to a neighbor for a weekend hunting trip.
Further, the textual definition of “transfer” as any “delivery of a fire-
arm to another person” is broad enough to encompass the return of a lent
firearm. In a typical backyard target shooting scenario, the gun owner hands
his rifle to a friend, who will take five shots with the gun; that is one trans-
fer. When the friend hands the gun back to the owner, that action is a second
transfer. Likewise, giving the neighbor a rifle for a hunting trip is one trans-
fer, and the return of the rifle after the hunting trip is over is a second
transfer.
Under the Bloomberg federal model, there are a few types of transfers
that do not require FFL processing.55 Within a nuclear family (spouses and
parent/child), persons may make permanent gifts of firearms to each other.56
However, intra-family lending or selling are not exempted, and so require
FFL processing.57 Also under the Bloomberg model, individuals may trans-
fer firearms while at an established shooting range owned by a corporation
or a government for use at the range.58 When hunters are actually in the field,
52 Background Checks, Everytown for Gun Safety, http://everytownresearch.org/issue/
background-checks/ [http://perma.cc/54VT-C6SB] (last updated Oct. 10, 2015).
53 See Chow v. State, 903 A.2d 388, 402 (Md. 2006) (holding that “transfer” means “a
permanent exchange of title or possession and does not include gratuitous temporary ex-
changes or loans” (emphasis in original)).
54
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.41.010(25) (2015).
55 The analysis of the federal Bloomberg model is based on S. 374, introduced in February
2013. Fix Gun Checks Act of 2013, S. 374, 113th Cong. § 202(a)(4). Perhaps because the
Everytown organization and its congressional allies are concentrating on bills which might
have a greater chance of passage in the current Congress, the bill has not yet been reintroduced




\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\53-1\HLL105.txt unknown Seq: 12 20-JAN-16 10:30
314 Harvard Journal on Legislation [Vol. 53
they may temporarily transfer firearms to each other—such as when hunter
A climbs over a fence and temporarily hands his gun to hunter B for safety.59
As enacted (in Colorado, Washington, Oregon) or as a proposed ballot
issue (in Nevada), the exceptions are sometimes broader, as will be detailed
in Part III. Even so, the Bloomberg system still requires FFL processing for
huge numbers of loans and returns.
Under the Bloomberg system, transfers may only take place at a gun
store (an FFL’s business premises).60 The transfer must be conducted exactly
as if the retailer were selling a firearm out of her inventory.61 So the trans-
feree (the neighbor borrowing the hunting gun) must fill out ATF Form
4473,62 the retailer must contact the FBI or its state counterpart for a back-
ground check on the transferee, and then the retailer must take custody of the
gun and record the acquisition in her Acquisition and Disposition book.63
Finally, the retailer hands the gun to the transferee and records the disposi-
tion in her Acquisition and Disposition book.64 A few days later, after the
hunting trip is over, the process must be repeated for the neighbor to return
the gun to the owner; this time, the owner will be the “transferee,” who will
fill out Form 4473 and undergo the background check.
The FBI does not charge a fee for conducting background checks, but
some states that have a state Point of Contact require a fee.65 So the transfer
of a loan and then a return would require two separate background check
fees.
The paperwork process is time-consuming for the FFL. When the FFL
sells a firearm out of her own inventory, she can mark up the wholesale price
to a retail price at a level to cover her costs, including the time cost of
59 See id. One of the well-known rules of hunter safety is to not carry a gun when climbing
a fence. After hunter A is on the other side of the fence, hunter B hands his own gun and A’s
gun to hunter A. Then hunter B climbs the fence. Afterward, A hands B’s gun back to B. See,
e.g., Chapter 6—Hunting Safety, TEX. PARKS & WILDLIFE DEP’T, https://tpwd.texas.gov/educa-
tion/hunter-education/online-course/hunting-safety [https://perma.cc/F3LE-3ZYK].
60 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-12-112(1)(a)(II) (2013) (stating that a transferor must
“[o]btain approval of a transfer from the bureau after a background check has been requested
by a licensed gun dealer, in accordance with section 24-33.5-424, C.R.S.”); id. at (2)(a) (“A
prospective firearm transferor who is not a licensed gun dealer shall arrange for a licensed gun
dealer to obtain the background check required by this section.”).
61 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-12-112(2)(b) (“A licensed gun dealer who obtains a
background check on a prospective transferee shall record the transfer, as provided in section
12-26-102, C.R.S., and retain the records, as provided in section 12-26-103, C.R.S., in the
same manner as when conducting a sale, rental, or exchange at retail. The licensed gun dealer
shall comply with all state and federal laws, including 18 U.S.C. sec. 922, as if he or she were
transferring the firearm from his or her inventory to the prospective transferee.”).
62 See 27 C.F.R. § 478.124(a) (2015).
63 See 27 C.F.R. § 478.125(e) (2015).
64 See ATF Proc. 2013-1 (Mar. 15, 2013).
65 Is there a charge for NICS checks, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, & FIREARMS,
https://www.atf.gov/firearms/qa/there-charge-nics-checks [https://perma.cc/D45A-4GDK]
(last updated Sept. 14, 2015). For an example of state point of contact fees, see Firearms
Instant Check System (FICS), OREGON.GOV, http://www.oregon.gov/osp/id/pages/fics.aspx
[http://perma.cc/LDQ6-9GR3] (stating a fee of $10 per transaction).
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processing the paperwork. But for private sales and transfers, the FFL is not
selling anything. Processing the private sale, loan, or return takes up time
that the FFL could spend on something profitable, such as attending to an-
other customer who might purchase something from the FFL’s inventory.
Accordingly, most FFLs are unwilling to process private transfers unless
they can charge a fee which compensates them for their time. Typically, the
FFL will set a fee of $20 to $50 per transfer.66 If a state law forbids fees, or
sets a price cap lower than $20, very few FFLs will choose to offer transfer
services.67 In Colorado, where the price cap is $10, only about fifteen fire-
arms stores in the entire state are willing to process private transfers for this
amount.68
III. NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF THE BLOOMBERG LAWS
The Bloomberg laws treat most temporary loans of firearms and returns
of loaned firearms as if they were gun sales, with a requirement that they be
processed by a firearms dealer. As will be detailed in this section, the treat-
ment of loans and returns as if they were sales has severe consequences for
self-defense, safety instruction, hunting, target shooting, museums, safe stor-
age, and law enforcement. Furthermore, the Bloomberg laws make it impos-
66 In Colorado, many stores are willing to process private interstate sales of firearms, for
which stores can set the service price freely. Hardly any stores are willing to process private
intrastate sales (or loans and returns) for the $10 fee cap mandated by Colorado’s Bloomberg
law. See Attachment A in Reply Brief for Appellants Nonprofit Organizations et al. at 1,
Colorado Outfitters Ass’n v. Hickenlooper, No. 14-1290 (10th Cir. May 29, 2015), http://
coloradoguncase.org/reply-attachment-A-maps.pdf [http://perma.cc/U43G-VTEU].
67 For example, the owner of Rocky Mountain Shooter Supply, a Colorado gun store,
testified that he had analyzed the labor cost for his clerks to process a private sale or loan. The
cost was $40, and since Colorado capped the fee at $10, his store would not process such
transactions. Transcript of Record at 702–07, Colorado Outfitters Ass’n v. Hickenlooper, 24 F.
Supp. 2d 1050 (D. Colo. 2014) (No. 13-1300), http://coloradoguncase.org/trial%20transcripts/
ap032014outfittersctrl4.pdf [http://perma.cc/WCV8-LTRZ]. John Burrud, owner of Jensen
Arms, testified that his store’s fee for processing private interstate sales was $25. The Colorado
version of the Bloomberg law caps the fee for processing of intrastate private sales, loans and
returns at $10, which was too low for him to be able to offer the service. Id. at 755–58.
68 See Reply Brief for Appellants Nonprofit Organizations, Disabled Firearms Owners and
Firearms Manufacturers and Dealers at 7–12, Colorado Outfitters Ass’n (No. 14-1290), http://
coloradoguncase.org/reply-nonprofits-disabled-manufacturers-dealers.pdf [http://perma.cc/
JL6C-KM3D]; Attachment A in Reply Brief for Appellants Nonprofit Organizations et al.,
supra note 68, at 1; Attachment B in Reply Brief for Appellants Nonprofit Organizations,
Disabled Firearms Owners and Firearms Manufacturers and Dealers at 1, Colorado Outfitters
Ass’n (No. 14-1290), http://coloradoguncase.org/reply-attachment-B-CBI-background-data.pdf
[http://perma.cc/LM2R-NNJ7].
For an actual private sale, there can be additional costs, such as sales tax or use tax. The
Washington State version of the Bloomberg law exempts private sales from the state sales tax,
but not from the state use tax. See Wash. I-594, supra note 5, at § 10. The latter tax is 7.0% to R
9.6% of the item’s price, depending on the locality. See Local Sales & Use Tax Rates Excel
Format: 2015 Quarter 4, WASH. DEP’T OF REVENUE, http://dor.wa.gov/Content/GetAFormOr
Publication/FormBySubject/forms_LSUExcel.aspx [http://perma.cc/WQ7B-FDVQ]. Since the
Bloomberg system registers every transfer with the state, attempts to evade paying the use tax
would appear to be unwise.
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sible for young adults, aged eighteen to twenty, to lawfully purchase
handguns.
Is the damage intentional? The criticisms of the damage caused by
Bloomberg proposals have been around for years, as long as the proposals
themselves. While every state-level iteration of the Bloomberg bills has its
variations, successive iterations do little or nothing to fix the problems that
have been pointed out about previous versions. This could indicate that the
damage done is intentional.
A. Self-Defense
The Second Amendment includes “the core lawful purpose of self-de-
fense.”69 As will be detailed in Part VI, the Uniform Firearms Act, the model
gun control law of the 1920s and 1930s, imposed new controls on retail
handgun sales and was designed to protect “the lending of a weapon by one
citizen to another in case of emergency.”70
Under the Bloomberg laws, such lending is mostly forbidden. In the
Bloomberg federal model, there is no allowance for lending a firearm to a
citizen in case of emergency.71 Under the proposed Nevada initiative, the
latest version of the Bloomberg laws, a firearm may be loaned if the loan “is
necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm” and the loan
“lasts only so long as immediately necessary to prevent such imminent death
or great bodily harm.”72 Whatever “imminent” means, the loan is allowed
only as long as “immediately necessary.”
This exemption is exceedingly narrow. If people in a house were at-
tacked by rioters, the exemption would allow the sharing of all arms within
the house. But the exemption does not allow for a much more common self-
defense situation: a former domestic partner threatening a woman and her
children. An attack might come in the next hour, or the next month, or never.
The victim and her children cannot know. Because the attack is uncertain—
and is certainly not “immediate”—the woman cannot borrow a handgun
from a neighbor for her defense. Many domestic violence victims do not
have several hundred spare dollars so that they can buy their own gun.
In abortion jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has distinguished permis-
sible regulations from those “designed to strike at the right itself.”73 The
Second Circuit has applied this language and principle to the Second
69 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630 (2008).
70 Charles V. Imlay, The Uniform Firearms Act, 12 A.B.A. J. 767, 768 (1926) (description
of the Act by Chairman of the Committee on Firearms Laws of the National Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws). The Uniform Firearms Act is discussed at length below in Part VI of this
Article.
71 See S. 374, 113th Cong. § 202(a)(4)(t)(2) (2013) (describing exceptions for family gifts,
inheritances, transfers in the home, and for “hunting or sporting purposes”).
72 Nev. Background Check Initiative § 6(5) (Aug. 11, 2014).
73 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157–58 (2007).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\53-1\HLL105.txt unknown Seq: 15 20-JAN-16 10:30
2016] Background Checks for Firearms Sales and Loans 317
Amendment.74 In regard to self-defense, the Bloomberg laws strike at the
right itself.
B. Museums
Unlike self-defense, the display of historic firearms in museums is not
the core of the Second Amendment. But those displays implicate the Second
Amendment, because the Second Amendment contains more than solely the
core (the core protects “a personal right to keep and bear arms for lawful
purposes, most notably for self-defense within the home”75). And of course
museums have First Amendment rights, which can be violated, inter alia, by
forcing the removal of items from museum display.76 Typically, museums
own some of their exhibit items, and borrow others for temporary, special
exhibits. This latter activity is another casualty of the Bloomberg laws.
In Washington State, voters approved the Bloomberg law, Initiative
594, by a fifty-nine to forty-one percent margin in the November 2014 elec-
tion.77 It became operative on December 4, but its first effect came sooner.
The Lynden Pioneer Museum, in Bellingham, announced that it would re-
74 United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160, 168 n.6 (2d Cir. 2012) (stating that federal
statute setting procedures for importing out-of-state handguns was “not designed to strike at
the heart of the right itself”).
75 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 780 (2010). The right is “personal” in the
sense that it belongs to persons, rather than being a “collective right” which no person has a
right to exercise. The “collective right” theory was popular in some circles for several decades
in the twentieth century, but in Heller, all nine Justices brusquely rejected it. See David B.
Kopel, The Great Gun Control War of the 20th Century—and its Lessons for Today, 39 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 1527, 1547–50 (2012).
The “personal right” would not seem to depend on whether persons act by themselves, as
individuals, or act through a partnership, corporation, or other form of legal personhood: “a
supplier of firing range facilities is harmed by the firing range ban and is permitted to ‘act[ ]
as [an] advocate[ ] of the rights of third parties who seek access to’ its services.” Ezell v. City
of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 696 (7th Cir. 2011) (alterations in original) (quoting Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 195 (1976)). Similarly, museums and museum patrons would have the same
First and Second Amendment rights, regardless of whether the museum is organized as a sole
proprietorship, a partnership, a corporation, or so on.
76 See Brooklyn Inst. of Arts & Sci. v. City of New York, 64 F. Supp. 2d 184, 199
(E.D.N.Y. 1999); Cuban Museum of Arts & Culture, Inc. v. City of Miami, 766 F. Supp. 1121,
1125 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
77 November 4, 2014 General Election Results: Initiative Measure No. 594 Concerns
background checks for firearm sales and transfers, WASH. SEC’Y OF STATE ELECTIONS & VOT-
ING, http://results.vote.wa.gov/results/20141104/State-Measures-Initiative-Measure-No-594-
Concerns-background-checks-for-firearm-sales-and-transfers.html [http://perma.cc/8YB9-
GZZ9] (last updated Nov. 25, 2014).
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move eleven historic rifles.78 The rifles were part of an exhibit titled “Over
the Beach: The WWII Pacific Theater.”79
The museum staff explained: “The museum will be returning these
guns to their owners because as of Dec 4th, we would be in violation of the
law if we had loaned firearms that had not undergone the background check
procedure. Nor would we be able to return those firearms unless the owners
completed the back ground [sic] check procedure.”80 The museum, which is
a small nonprofit, said that it did not have the financial resources to purchase
the firearms, nor to pay for the background checks that would be necessary
(after December 4, 2015) to return the guns to their owners.81 Fortunately, a
local pawnshop, after learning of the museum’s problems, stepped forward
and offered to perform the requisite background checks at its own expense,
allowing the museum to keep many but not all of the historic firearms until
the exhibit ended in May 2015.82
A spokesperson for the Bloomberg initiative said, “You can’t craft
every possibility into every law.”83 This may be true. It is a good reason that
laws sold to the public as covering “background checks on private sales”
should be written to apply only to private sales and not to loans.
C. Firearms Safety Instruction
While museum-held firearms might not be the first issue that springs to
mind when considering the criminalization of firearms loans, short-term
loans for firearms safety training is an obvious issue. Any sensible firearms
policy should encourage, and not impede, safety instruction. The Bloomberg
laws do just the opposite. Even momentary firearms transfers are generally
prohibited, unless they take place at a corporate target range.84
78 Some of the guns included in the museum’s exhibit were a rare Johnson M1941, a
Reising submachine gun, and a 1935 Japanese 7.7mm Type 99 machine gun, captured by
American soldiers. Law forces Washington museum to remove WWII weapons, N.Y. POST
(Nov. 20, 2014), http://nypost.com/2014/11/20/law-forces-washington-museum-to-remove-
wwii-weapons/ [http://perma.cc/8D2R-46UZ]; Ralph Schwartz, Wary of new gun law, Lynden
museum to pull WWII rifles from exhibit, BELLINGHAM HER. (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www
.bellinghamherald.com/news/local/article22259031.html [http://perma.cc/FAV4-BTCZ]; see
also Chris Eger, Background Check Expansion Forces Museum to Return Firearms to Donors,
GUNS.COM (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.guns.com/2014/11/20/background-check-expansion-
forces-museum-to-return-firearms-to-donors/ [http://perma.cc/J4AY-L29W].
79 See Eger, supra note 78. R
80 Lynden Pioneer Museum, Facebook (Nov. 13, 2014, 4:32 PM), https://www.facebook
.com/lyndenpioneermuseum/posts/10152557345669790 [https://perma.cc/8NQC-VNZC].
81 See Schwartz, supra note 78. R
82 Lynden museum to keep WWII gun display after pawn shop offers to do I-594
paperwork, BELLINGHAM HER. (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.bellinghamherald.com/news/local/
article22259799.html [http://perma.cc/UHF7-H9VR].
83 Law forces Washington museum to remove WWII weapons, supra note 78. R
84 See S. 374, 113th. Cong. § 202(a)(4) (2013) (covering nearly all transfers, but exclud-
ing transfers “at a shooting range located in or on premises owned or occupied by a duly
incorporated organization organized for conservation purposes or to foster proficiency in
firearms”).
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Some safety courses do include a “live fire” component, in which stu-
dents fire guns at a range under the supervision of the instructor.85 However,
even the courses that have live fire also have an extensive classroom compo-
nent. Some introductory courses are classroom-only. In the classroom, doz-
ens of firearms transfers will take place. Many students may not yet own a
firearm; even if a student does own a firearm, many instructors choose to
allow only their personal firearms in the classroom, as the instructor may
want to teach particular facts about particular types of firearms. The instruc-
tor also wants to use firearms that he is certain are in good working order. In
any classroom setting, functional ammunition is absolutely forbidden.86
In the classroom, students are taught how to handle guns safely. Some
safety skills can be taught with inert, plastic replicas—for example, the les-
son that a person should always keep the gun pointed in a safe direction, or
that a person should keep her finger off the trigger until the gun is on target.
Learning other safety skills, though, requires using a real gun. For example,
when a person hands a gun to someone else, she must first make sure that
the gun is unloaded, that the safety is “on,” and that the gun is inoperable
because the “action” is open. For this latter requirement, this would mean
that a double-barreled shotgun is broken open, so that the hinged barrels are
not aligned with the rest of the gun. For a semi-automatic gun, it would
mean that the slide is locked back into the open position. For a revolver, it
would mean that the cylinder is swung open, and not inside the rest of the
gun. Teaching students how to do this requires using real guns.
Another element of safety instruction is teaching students how to safely
load and unload a gun. This is typically done by using real guns along with
inert dummy ammunition. During the course of instruction, the instructors
and students may transfer firearms dozens of times, with each transfer last-
ing only a few minutes or less.
Under the Bloomberg laws, the above activities are allowed only if they
take place at a firing range owned by a corporation. Pre-Bloomberg, these
classes had been commonly offered in office buildings, churches, schools,
and homes. Limiting the classes only to target ranges makes the classes
much more inconvenient. Target ranges are often located on the outskirts of
town, not where most people live. In rural areas, there might be many places
where shooting is lawful and safe, but the nearest corporate-owned shooting
range might be far away. The likely result will be fewer people taking safety
classes.
In Washington, the state government now claims that volunteer hunter
education instructors teaching the course required by the Washington De-
85 See, e.g., Mass Basic Firearms Safety Course, Mass Firearms Sch., http://www.mass-
firearmsschool.com/class/mass-basic-firearms-safety-course/ [http://perma.cc/U985-JLTT].
86 See, e.g., NRA Basic Pistol Training Department: Standard Operating Procedures,
NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N (2015), www.shongum.org/images/NRABasicPistolSOP.pdf [http://perma
.cc/2QPL-KD8T].
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\53-1\HLL105.txt unknown Seq: 18 20-JAN-16 10:30
320 Harvard Journal on Legislation [Vol. 53
partment of Fish and Wildlife are exempt because the Department is a law
enforcement agency.87
Even with this exemption for hunter safety instructors, those instructors
cannot allow students to “transfer” firearms to each other by practicing how
to safely hand a gun back and forth.88 Nor does the exemption help the many
instructors and students who take courses other than the State’s hunter safety
program. These non-exempted instructors teach courses for students who are
not interested in obtaining a hunting license, but who are interested in learn-
ing how to own and use firearms responsibly.
Also criminalized is the informal safety training which has always been
a traditional part of normal use of firearms; for example, inviting a friend to
one’s home and teaching him how to handle an unloaded firearm.89 As with
museums, the effect of the Bloomberg laws on safety training is purely de-
structive. Impeding safety training harms public safety and provides no
benefits.
The purpose of the Bloomberg laws is, supposedly, to prevent prohib-
ited persons from obtaining firearms, since prohibited persons are more
likely to perpetrate firearms crimes. In formal or informal safety training,
there is no realistic risk that a student who holds a firearm for a few mo-
ments, before transferring it to another student or the instructor, is going to
use that firearm in a violent crime.
D. Families
Proponents of the Bloomberg laws point out that the laws have exemp-
tions for “family.” This is politically sensible, since many voters do not
believe that the government should meddle in innocent intra-family activi-
ties. The family exemption also makes sense criminologically. A person who
privately sells a gun to a stranger may have no idea whether that stranger is a
prohibited person. But when people sell (or loan) to individuals whom they
personally know, the risks of unintentionally giving a gun to a prohibited
person are much less. So it is reasonable that rules on private sales/loans
among strangers should be different from the rules for sales/loans among
people who know each other. Family members likely know each other better
than they know anyone else.
All versions of the Bloomberg laws have some form of family exemp-
tion, but they are unreasonably narrow. The Bloomberg laws allow family
87 Memo from David Whipple, Hunter Education Division Manager, to Hunter Education
Instructors, Analysis of Initiative 594 (Dec. 2, 2014), http://hunting-washington.com/smf/in-
dex.php?topic=166188.0 [http://perma.cc/JD6Y-D875].
88 See id. (“[I]t does not initially appear that student-to-student transfers of firearms
would fall within the general WDFW exemption for law enforcement agencies.”).
89 Compare S. 374, 113th Cong. § 202(2)(C) (2013) (allowing transfers of up to seven
days within a home or its curtilage), with Wash. I-594, supra note 5, at § 3. R
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\53-1\HLL105.txt unknown Seq: 19 20-JAN-16 10:30
2016] Background Checks for Firearms Sales and Loans 321
members to make a “bona fide gift” of a firearm to each other.90 In the
federal proposal, this exception includes only spouses, parents, children,
grandparents, and siblings.91 In Washington, it also includes aunts, uncles,
nieces, nephews, and first cousins.92 The federal and Washington models
take care of gifts, but they forbid family members from lending guns to each
other, or from selling guns to each other. The federal law has no provision
for this type of transfer, while the Washington law allows temporary trans-
fers only between spouses and domestic partners.93 The proposed Nevada
language is somewhat broader, covering “sale or transfer,” and also speci-
fies that step-relations, adopted children, and half-blood relations are part of
a family.94 In none of the Bloomberg laws are in-laws considered to be a
member of one’s family.
E. Minors and Young Adults
The federal GCA prohibits FFLs from transferring handguns to persons
under twenty-one and long guns to persons under eighteen.95 The proposed
Bloomberg laws require that all firearms transfers be routed through an FFL.
Thus, it is legally impossible to transfer a handgun to an eighteen-to-twenty-
year-old or any gun to a minor.
This proscription represents a major expansion of the category of per-
sons who are prevented from possessing firearms. Laws specifically about
gun possession by persons under twenty-one have not gone so far. Federal
law limits but does not forbid handgun possession by persons under eigh-
teen.96 Thirty-seven states have some law creating a minimum age to
purchase, or a minimum age to possess; some of these laws are only for
handguns, and others are for all guns.97 Federal law has no special limits on
handgun possession by eighteen-to-twenty-year-olds. Again, most state laws
are similar.98 Federal law imposes no restrictions on long gun possession by
persons under eighteen, and the same is mostly true at the state level.99
90 S. 374 § 202(2)(A); Wash. I-594, supra note 5, at § 3(4)(a). R
91 S. 374 § 202(2)(A).
92 Wash. I-594, supra note 5, at § 3(4)(a). R
93 Id. § 3(4)(f)(i).
94 Nev. Background Check Initiative, § 6(3) (Aug. 11, 2014).
95 18 U.S.C. § 922(c)(1) (2012).
96 18 U.S.C. § 922(x) (2012).
97 See Minimum Age to Purchase & Possess Firearms Policy Summary, LAW CTR. TO
PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE (Oct. 1, 2013), http://smartgunlaws.org/minimum-age-to-purchase-
possess-firearms-policy-summary [http://perma.cc/WM6W-QKPN].
98 Nine states set a minimum age of twenty-one for handgun possession; New Mexico’s is
nineteen. See id.
99 Illinois forbids long gun possession by persons under twenty-one; fifteen states have a
minimum age of eighteen; two of sixteen; and one of fourteen. Most of these laws have excep-
tions for when the person’s parent or guardian is present or has authorized the possession, or
while hunting or target shooting. See id.
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In the firearms policy debate, there is room for discussion of these top-
ics and legislative changes if a majority supports such a change. The Bloom-
berg laws, however, impose major prohibitions on persons under twenty-
one, and do so sub silentio, without public debate. By mandating that all
firearms acquisitions must pass through an FFL, the Bloomberg laws exploit
the special rules for FFLs, and thereby make gun acquisition nearly impossi-
ble for persons under twenty-one (handguns) or under eighteen (all guns).
In the new Washington law (and its proposed federal counterpart), only
a “bona fide gift” between family members is allowed. If family members
want to loan guns to each other, they must have the loan processed by a gun
store. If the family member is under twenty-one (for handguns) or under
eighteen (for all guns), the gun store cannot process the transfer, and thus the
loan is impossible. So a mother may not loan her handgun to her twenty-
year-old daughter to take for protection on a camping trip. Nor to her eigh-
teen-year-old son, who wants to go to a target range for the afternoon. A
seventeen-year-old may have a hunting license in many states. But his father
may not loan him a shotgun to use for hunting.
The exceptions in the Bloomberg laws are insufficient. In Washington,
loans of firearms to minors are allowed if the person will be “under the
direct supervision and control” of a person over twenty-one.100 This
presumes that persons of college age, some of whom have served in the
military, lack the maturity to go hunting or camping with friends their own
age, without the supervision of an older person.
The Nevada proposal, allowing intra-family loans and sales (and not
just “bona fide” gifts) is better.101 But like all versions of the Bloomberg
laws, it does not address the problem of young people who want to buy a
firearm. Under the federal GCA, persons under twenty-one cannot buy hand-
guns from gun stores, but they can buy handguns from private individuals.
The same is true for persons under eighteen purchasing long guns. By re-
quiring that all purchases be routed through a gun store, the Bloomberg laws
make these purchases impossible.
Can a parent buy a handgun for a twenty-year-old son or daughter? The
Bloomberg model does allow parents to make “a bona fide gift” of a firearm
to a child. But if the child gets involved in picking out the gun, this can be
considered a “straw purchase” under federal law.102 Under the GCA, it is
unlawful to purchase a firearm on behalf of another person, even if the other
person is also legally qualified to own the firearm.103
100
WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 9.41.113 (West 2015).
101 Nev. Background Check Initiative, § 6(3) (Aug. 11, 2014).
102 See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 109 F.3d 1456 (9th Cir. 2007); cf. Abramski v.
United States, 134 S. Ct. 2259 (2014) (discussing case in which law enforcement officer, using
a discount available only to law enforcement officers, purchased a firearm to sell it to his
uncle—both lawful gun-owners—yet still holding Abramski was guilty of felony as a straw
purchaser).
103 ATF Form 4473, supra note 11 (asking in Question 11.a., “Are you the actual trans- R
feree/buyer of the firearm(s) listed on this form? Warning: You are not the actual buyer if you
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Finally, not all persons under twenty-one are dependents of a parent
who would buy them a firearm. Some of them are legally emancipated. The
Bloomberg proposals make it impossible for them to purchase a gun. Al-
though existing federal law would not allow an emancipated twenty-year-old
woman to purchase a handgun in a retail store, she would be allowed to
purchase the handgun in a private sale, but for the Bloomberg laws. As will
be discussed in Part VII, it is perfectly possible to have background checks
on private sales without requiring that the check be conducted on the busi-
ness premises of a retail gun store. It is the Bloomberg requirement that
FFLs be the chokepoint for all firearms transfers that is responsible for
thwarting arms acquisition by persons under twenty-one, including borrow-
ing a gun for a few hours of sport.
F. Firearms Sharing on One’s Property
One very common activity of gun owners is sharing their firearms on
their own property. A person who owns thirty acres might have a small
target range set up. He invites some friends over for the afternoon, shoots at
targets with rifles or handguns, and lets the friends use the family’s guns. Or
a farm family might have a skeet or trap thrower, which flings clay disks
into the air. For this type of shooting, shotguns, which fire several dozen
small, round pellets, are used. Informal shooting events like this are at the
heart of American gun culture. They promote friendship, community, and
practice in the safe handling of firearms.
They are also criminalized by some versions of the Bloomberg laws.
For example, the Washington provision has no exemption for sharing a fire-
arm on one’s property.104 Sharing does not have to involve firing a gun. In-
side the home, an owner might allow a visitor to handle his unloaded gun.
Perhaps the visitor is interested in buying a new gun like the gun the owner
owns. Or the visitor is just interested in guns. Or the gun might benefit from
an adjustment that the visitor knows how to perform well, but the owner
does not. Again, this type of innocent sharing is criminalized in Washington.
Sharing may take place at a corporate or government target range, but never
on one’s property.
Instead, the owner and the visitor are supposed to travel to a gun store
to get permission, fill out all the paperwork, and pay the fees before the gun
is handed over. When the visitor is done with the gun, everyone must return
to the gun store and repeat the process, before the gun can be returned to its
owner.
The problem is worst in Washington state, where Initiative 594 has no
exemptions for the above ordinary activities. In the federal model, there is an
are acquiring the firearm(s) on behalf of another person. If you are not the actual buyer, the
dealer cannot transfer the firearm(s) to you.”).
104 Wash. I-594, supra note 5. R
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exemption for sharing a firearm within one’s own home or curtilage.105 This
takes care of letting a friend examine one’s new firearm. But if the friend
brings his new gun to someone else’s house, it is a federal felony if he lets
that person handle that gun for a few minutes.
The federal version has an exemption for sharing inside the home and
its “curtilage.” Definitions of “curtilage” vary, but none of them would in-
clude the typical location of an outdoor firing range. By some definitions,
the curtilage must be enclosed (as with an interior courtyard); others would
encompass unenclosed areas “around the dwelling house, and generally in-
clude the buildings used for domestic purposes in the conduct of family af-
fairs” (e.g., an outhouse, a detached garage).106
If the two friends then go target shooting on the owner’s property, that
is also a federal felony. The way to avoid the felony would be to stand on the
porch while target shooting, thus remaining in the “curtilage.” Questions
about the definition often arise in search and seizure law; the Supreme Court
has held that a barn sixty yards away from the house was not within the
curtilage.107 For obvious safety reasons, most people set up their target
ranges away from the house and do not use the curtilage as a shooting
platform.
The Nevada proposal addresses the above problems with an exemption
for any transferee “[w]hile in the presence of the transferor.”108 This provi-
sion could be read with flexibility—for example, so that the transferor can
step out of the room to take a phone call, or can leave the backyard shooting
range to go in the house for several minutes. If applied flexibly, the Nevada
exemption would be helpful.
But even the Nevada language does not help farmers and ranchers. Fire-
arms transfers at farms and ranches are a routine part of operations. Some of
these might last for only a few hours, while others last for several weeks—as
when a ranch hand takes a gun to guard a flock night and day during calving
season. The farmer or rancher will not stay in the hand’s “presence.” The
hand needs to do work in one location, and the farmer or rancher in another.
Under the Bloomberg laws, for a farmer or rancher to lend a firearm to
an employee, they both must travel to a gun store to process the transaction.
When the employee returns the firearm, everyone must return to the gun
store. Because few farms and ranches are located near gun stores, the pro-
cess typically requires hours of travel time for the loan, and hours more for
the return. This takes the farmer, the rancher, and their hands away from the
farm or ranch during what may be the busiest period of the year, when eve-
ryone needs to work from sunup to sundown.
105 S. 374, 113th Cong. § 202(2)(C) (2013).
106 Curtilage, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979).
107 United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 296 (1987).
108 Nev. Background Check Initiative § 6(6)(c)(v) (Aug. 11, 2014).
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G. Firearms Sharing on Public Lands
The Bloomberg laws contain exemptions for firearms sharing at some
target ranges. In the federal bill, the shooting range must be owned or oper-
ated by a corporation.109 In Washington, it must be “an established shooting
range authorized by the governing body of the jurisdiction.”110 Nevada cop-
ies the Washington language.111
Not everyone has access to an “established” target range. In rural areas
with low population density, the nearest established range may be many
miles away. In urban areas, the waiting lists for membership in a gun club
may stretch out for years. Established public ranges exist, but in many areas,
there are few, if any; and those that do exist may be a long ways away, or
may be crowded. Accordingly, it has always been common in America for
people to engage in target practice at informal ranges on public lands. Many
of these lands are owned by the U.S. National Forest Service, the Bureau of
Land Management, or a state or local equivalent.112
The general rule is that shooting is lawful anywhere on these lands,
except for certain specified areas which are off-limits, such as areas near
buildings or roads.113 Of course one must always obey all safety rules, which
includes ensuring that there is a safe backstop to the target, such as a mound
of dirt.
The public lands are not “established” ranges. Thus, it is illegal to
share guns there as well. During a debate on the Washington State initiative
for the Bloomberg law, NRA representative Brian Judy pointed out the prob-
lem. Initiative spokesperson Cheryl Stumbo did not dispute the accuracy of
his claim, but retorted that it would be safer to shoot only on formal
ranges.114
109 S. 374, 113th Cong. § 202(2)(D)(i) (allowing transfers “at a shooting range located in
or on premises owned or occupied by a duly incorporated organization organized for conserva-
tion purposes or to foster proficiency in firearms”).
110 Wash. I-594, supra note 5, at § 3(4)(f)(ii). R
111 Nev. Background Check Initiative § 6(6)(c)(i) (Aug. 11, 2014).
112 See, e.g., Jamie Schwartz, Shooting Sports, U.S. FOREST SERV., http://www.fs.fed.us/
recreation/programs/trails/welcome.shtml [http://perma.cc/BK3S-U5FR] (last updated Mar.
28, 2013) (“The only regulations specific to use of weapons imposed by the Forest Service is
that you cannot discharge a weapon within 150 yards of any structure/development or occu-
pied area, within or into a cave, across or on a road or body of water, or in any manner that
endangers a person.”); Bipartisan Sportsmen’s Act of 2015: Hearing on S. 556 Before the S.
Comm. on Energy & Natural Resources, 114th Cong. 2 (2015) (statement of Steve Ellis, Dep-
uty Director for Operations, Bureau of Land Management), http://www.energy.senate.gov/
public/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=4a53cafd-87f5-4a30-a593-87156773f6a7 [http://perma
.cc/923V-BWFM] (“BLM already regards public lands as open to fishing, hunting, and shoot-
ing unless it is demonstrated that the activity could result in unacceptable resource damage or
create a public health and safety hazard.”).
113 Schwartz, supra note 78. R
114 The Seattle Times Editorial Board: Debate Between Proponents and Opponents of I-
594, TVW (June 26, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://www.tvw.org/index.php?option=com_tvwplayer
&eventID=2014060083 [http://perma.cc/CET4-MUW2].
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But the Bloomberg laws are not presented to the public as proposals to
outlaw gun sharing on public lands and on private property. Nor are they
presented as bills to prevent persons under twenty-one years old from bor-
rowing firearms for sporting purposes. Rather, the bills are sold to the public
by the bait-and-switch method: proponents promise that the bills are only
about background checks on private sales, but the reality is that they
criminalize a huge amount of responsible activity that has nothing to do with
firearms sales.115
H. Safe Storage
Before the Bloomberg law went into effect in Colorado in 2013, Colo-
rado State University (“CSU”)—like many colleges and universities nation-
wide—allowed students to store their hunting guns with campus police.
When a student wanted to use the gun for hunting, he could check out the
gun from the campus police. After the hunting trip, he would return the gun
to them for storage. Because of the Bloomberg law, such an arrangement has
become impossible, and the safe storage program was ended.116 In order to
give the gun to the student, a campus police officer would have to travel
with the student to a gun store, where the store would process the student’s
gun acquisition as if selling a firearm out of its inventory, with all the associ-
ated paperwork. Later, when the hunting trip was completed, the student and
the campus police officer would have to return to the gun store to repeat the
process, this time treating the officer as if he were buying a gun from the
retailer. Because the CSU police did not have extra officers on hand to go
through this process for all relevant students, CSU was forced to shut down
its safe storage program.
This difficulty is not just a campus problem. Consider a person who
will be away from home for an extended period, such as a member of the
armed services being deployed overseas, a person going away to school, a
person going on a long vacation, or a person evacuating her home due to a
natural disaster. Such persons might wish to store firearms with a trusted
friend or family member for months or years. This type of storage should be
encouraged. Guns are less likely to be stolen by burglars, and then sold into
115 See Background Checks, EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY, http://everytownresearch.org/
issue/background-checks [http://perma.cc/JZ5Q-FXKP] (failing to mention loans); see also
Colorado Gun Case, INDEPENDENCE INST., http://coloradoguncase.org [http://perma.cc/M2LL-
2HW7] (providing full transcripts of legislative hearings and debate on Colorado law HB 13-
1229; no proponent of the law advocated for or addressed any alleged benefits or rationale for
restricting loans and returns).
116 See Transcript of Record at 813–14, Colorado Outfitters Assoc. v. Hickenlooper, 24 F.
Supp. 3d 1050 (D. Colo. 2014) (No. 13-CV-1300-MSK-MJW), http://coloradoguncase.org/
trial%20transcripts/ap032014outfittersctrl4.pdf [http://perma.cc/XB5R-RGWX]; see also
David Kopel, Safe storage of firearms: The harms from Bloomberg’s strange background
check system, WASH. POST. (Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2015/11/03/safe-storage-of-firearms-the-harms-from-bloombergs-strange-back-
ground-check-system/ [https://perma.cc/B2DY-Y9P5].
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the black market, if they are kept in a neighbor’s home rather than left in a
house that will be unoccupied for six weeks. If the law says that neighbor A
can only store neighbor B’s guns if both persons go to a gun store, fill out
extensive paperwork for every gun to be stored, pay per-gun fees to the
government and the gun store, and then repeat the process when the firearms
are returned, many fewer people will go through all that trouble. So more
guns will be left in unoccupied dwellings; they will be at greater risk of
being stolen and thus of being supplied to the criminal black market. Dis-
couraging the safe storage of firearms is one way the Bloomberg laws af-
firmatively harm public safety.
I. Hunting
Announcing the 2013 version of the federal Bloomberg bill, Senator
Schumer promised that it would not affect “your ability to borrow your Un-
cle Willie’s hunting rifle.”117 This assertion is true if your Uncle Willie hands
you his rifle while the two of you are out in the field hunting deer. However,
if Uncle Willie stays home and just lets you borrow his rifle when you go
hunting for the weekend, then both of you are guilty of a federal felony—the
same felony as if each of you had knowingly sold a gun to a convicted
violent felon.118
Suppose that you go hunting with Uncle Willie, and return to a motel
after a day of hunting. You would like to help Uncle Willie clean his gun. Or
maybe his gun has a malfunction, and you would like to fix it. That would be
against the law. The hunting exception only applies “while hunting if the
hunting is legal in all places where the person to whom the firearm is trans-
ferred possesses the firearm.”119 Motel rooms are not legal places for hunt-
ing. You and Uncle Willie are both criminals.
J. Law Enforcement
The Colorado version of the Bloomberg law has no exception for law
enforcement officers acting during the course of their official duties.120 Yet
firearms transfers are a routine part of ordinary law enforcement operations.
The following examples are common for officers:
• Returning a lost or stolen firearm to its rightful owner;
117 Sen. Kirk, Colleagues Seek Deal on Gun Background Checks, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (Feb.
8, 2013), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20130208/NEWS02/130209776?template=
printart [http://perma.cc/65BD-PTD3].
118 Compare S. 374, 113 Cong. § 202(2)(D), with CAL. PENAL CODE § 27950 (2015) (al-
lowing loan of long guns for duration of relevant hunting season in state with statute—not
drafted by Bloomberg organization—requiring background checks on private sales of
firearms).
119 Wash. I-594, supra note 5, at § 3(4)(f)(v). R
120
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-12-112 (2015).
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• Taking a firearm from the scene of an auto accident, and later re-
turning the firearm to the victim;
• Taking a firearm as evidence from the scene of a crime, or from a
criminal suspect;
• Transferring a firearm to the law enforcement office’s evidence cus-
todian, to a new evidence custodian, or to a temporary custodian
when the regular custodian is absent;
• Transferring firearms to or from regional crime labs;
• Transferring firearms from the office armory to officers for long-term
use;
• Taking custody of an officer’s personally-owned duty firearm, when
the deputy is involved in a shooting, and later returning the firearm to
the officer; and
• Taking custody of all office-owned firearms whenever an officer is
under investigation.
Under the Bloomberg law in Colorado, the above transfers may only take
place at the business premises of an FFL. As with other firearms transfers
under the Bloomberg system, the FFL must process the transfer as if he were
selling a firearm out of his own inventory.
A volunteer FFL could not provide this service at a law enforcement
agency office. It would be a federal felony for an FFL to transfer firearms at
a sheriff’s office or a police department. FFLs may only conduct firearms
transfers at the single business premises specified on their license, or at a
gun show.121 This is a pointless restriction; a person who is federally licensed
to process firearms transfers should be allowed to process them in all legiti-
mate locations.
121 18 U.S.C. §§ 923(d)(1)(E), 923(j) (2012); 27 C.F.R. § 478.100 (2015).
The above crimes may not normally be prosecutorial priorities for District Attorneys, but law
enforcement officers must model law-abiding behavior, and serve as examples for the general
public. Two months after Colorado sheriffs filed a lawsuit against the Colorado Bloomberg
law, the Colorado Bureau of Investigation sent an email attachment with no letterhead to the
police chiefs and sheriffs; it purported to invent a new exception to HB 13-1229 for some of
the above law enforcement activities, namely providing agency arms to officers. As officers
were background-checked before they were hired, “CBI believes that it is unnecessary for a
Law Enforcement Agency to conduct an additional NICS background check by an FFL before
transferring a firearm to a POST Certified Peace Officer employed by the agency for official
use. As always, agencies may wish to seek guidance from their legal advisor.” Fifty-Five
Colorado Sheriffs’ Response Brief to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Them in Their Official
Capacities at 21, Cooke v. Hickenlooper, No. 13-CV-1300-MSK-MJW (D. Colo. Aug. 22,
2013) (quoting email sent from CBI to police chiefs and sheriffs), http://coloradoguncase.org/
Sheriffs-response-to-MTD.pdf [http://perma.cc/BJV8-DX8N]; see also Transcript of Record,
supra note 116, at 1361–63 (testimony of CBI Director Ronald Sloan), http://coloradoguncase R
.org/trial%20transcripts/ap072014outfitters6.pdf [http://perma.cc/5UJ3-XJW6].
The informal expression of an unpublished, non-binding belief by a bureau without enforce-
ment authority is small comfort. Nor does CBI’s expressions of what it “believes” is “unnec-
essary” address many of the situations described above.
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K. Unreasonable Penalties for Easily Violated Laws
The penalties for violating the Bloomberg laws are severe. Federally,
the proposed penalty is the same as for giving a firearm to a person known to
be a convicted violent felon.122 In Colorado, the first offense is a Class 1
misdemeanor (the highest level) with automatic forfeiture of the right to
keep and bear arms for two years.123 In Washington, the first conviction is a
gross misdemeanor (up to ninety days in jail and a $1,000 fine). A second
violation is a Class C felony (up to five years in prison and a $10,000
fine).124 As with other crimes, the second conviction can arise out of the
same transaction as the first and need not be preceded by a conviction—for
example, loaning two firearms to a friend in a single event, or “transferring”
one firearm to a student at a gun safety class and then receiving the “trans-
fer” of the firearm back from the student during the same class. Felony con-
victions automatically prohibit a person from possessing a firearm for the
rest of her life.125
The Washington State Law Enforcement Firearms Instructors Associa-
tion opposed the Bloomberg proposal, Initiative 594.126 They wrote that
“I594 is a law so broadly written that it clearly is designed to make
criminals of all recreational shooters and most law enforcement officers.”127
Further, it “is a law that will be impossible to police, intended to criminalize
only good citizens, a costly misdirection of scarce [law enforcement] re-
sources and funds, and a statute so broadly written that many of your own
activities will become crimes.”128 In short, “I594 transforms casual, inno-
cent, ordinary, non-criminal behavior into a misdemeanor or felony.”129 For
similar reasons, the large majority of Colorado’s sheriffs filed a civil rights
lawsuit against the Colorado version of the Bloomberg law.130
Aggravating problems for the law-abiding, the Bloomberg laws allow
prosecution of compliant gun owners; the exceptions (e.g., a parent-to-child
gift) are structured as an “affirmative defense.”131 An “affirmative defense”
is no defense at all until trial. A person can be indicted and then put on trial
for the crime of giving her adult son a shotgun. After the prosecution’s case
122 See S. 374, 113th Cong. § 203(b) (2013).
123
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-12-112(9)(a) (2015).
124 Wash. I-594, supra note 5, at § 9. R
125 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).






130 See Opening Brief of Sheriffs and David Strumillo, Beicker v. Hickenlooper, No. 14-
1292 (10th Cir. Jan. 16, 2015), http://coloradoguncase.org/Appeal/Sheriffs-opening-brief-Final
.pdf [http://perma.cc/B8CT-6XJF] (noting that litigants are fifty-four elected county sheriffs,
and twenty-four retired sheriffs.).
131 Wash. I-594, supra note 5, at § 9. R
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has been completed, then and only then can the defendant raise the “affirma-
tive defense” about inter-family gifts.
One might hope that such a case would never be brought in the first
place. Indeed, as will be described in the next section, the only substantive
response to most of the above criticisms has been that law enforcement will
not actually enforce the law.
L. Responses to the Above Criticisms
Cheryl Stumbo, one of Mr. Bloomberg’s staffers in Washington State,
dismissed the above concerns as “one in a million hypotheticals,” as if loan-
ing a gun to a neighbor who was a domestic violence victim were a bizarre
and unusual activity.132 The chief spokesman for Washington’s I-594 was
Dan Satterberg, the King County Prosecutor.133 Satterberg acknowledged
that the text of I-594 does outlaw sharing among family and friends.134 Yet at
a Seattle Times debate on I-594, he dismissed the problem as “an absurd
hypothetical.”135 He insisted that personal loans were not the point of the
initiative.136
That was a strange claim by an experienced prosecutor. The law is
whatever the law says, and the law outlaws almost all sharing of firearms. A
law which was about background checks on private sales, but not about
loans, would have an exemption like that in California—where loans of up
to thirty days are allowed between people who personally know each
other.137
During the I-594 campaign, proponents also argued that, no matter
what the law actually said, prosecutors would not bring cases against per-
sons for obviously benign temporary loans and returns.138 They also asserted
that the law would be applied according to its “intent,” covering only trans-
fers in the ordinary sense of firearms law (permanent dispositions).139 But
this argument ignored the special, extremely broad definition of “transfer”
that was written into the law itself. And as soon as I-594 became law, it was
132 The Seattle Times Editorial Board: Debate Between Proponents and Opponents of I-
594, supra note 114. R
133 See id. King County includes Seattle and a huge region of suburbs to the north, south,
and east. As revealed during the Seattle Times debate, Satterberg had privately said that I-594
would be a waste of prosecutorial and police resources—an ineffective law that would be
ignored by gang members and drug dealers. Yet Satterberg felt that he had to support it be-
cause he himself would also be on the ballot in November 2014. This turned out to be good
political strategy. Perhaps as a result of Satterberg taking the lead on gun control, the Demo-





CAL. PENAL CODE § 27885 (2015).
138 Joseph O’Sullivan, Semantics Triggers Opposition to I-594’s Gun-Sale Checks, SEAT-
TLE TIMES (Sept. 21, 2014), http://www.seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/20245908
15_594transfersxml.html [http://perma.cc/957B-63GW].
139 Id.
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the law’s text that mattered, not its supposed intent. That is why firearms
safety classes and museum displays of firearms were the first things to be
constricted by I-594.140
Hypothesizing that most law enforcement officers will simply ignore
the text of the laws, and instead enforce the law based on their discernment
of the proponents’ intent, the text of the Bloomberg laws still provides law
enforcement officers with the nearly limitless ability to arrest and prosecute
gun owners selectively—perhaps to harass a person for being politically out-
spoken, or because of a personal grudge, or to make a political point, or for
any other reason.141
As Justice O’Connor explained for the Supreme Court, the Constitution
is violated when a criminal statute permits “a standardless sweep [that] al-
lows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilec-
tions.”142 She observed that this principle can be traced back to the Supreme
Court’s 1875 statement in United States v. Reese: “It would certainly be
dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible
offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who could be
rightfully detained, and who should be set at large.”143
Most importantly, the primary mechanism by which gun laws are en-
forced is that law-abiding people self-enforce them. If a particular portion of
public lands are posted as off-limits to target shooting, then the vast majority
of gun owners will not shoot there, even if they believe that the posting is
mistaken because the area is perfectly safe. Many people carry concealed
handguns in areas where they have a permit to do so, and they do not carry
in areas where carry is not permitted. Although they know that the chance of
being caught and prosecuted for carrying a concealed handgun is essentially
nil, they choose to obey the law. Because most gun owners are scrupulous
about gun law compliance, the Bloomberg laws damage responsible gun
ownership.
140 See supra Part III.B–C.
141 A U.S. Senate subcommittee investigation found that “approximately 75 percent of
BATF gun prosecutions were aimed at ordinary citizens who had neither criminal intent nor
knowledge, but were enticed by agents into unknowing technical violations.” S. COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 97TH CONG., REP. ON THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, U.S. GOV’T
PRINTING OFF. REP. NO. 88-618 O (1982), http://www.constitution.org/2ll/2ndschol/87senrpt
.pdf [http://perma.cc/J38B-3FK3]; see also Bonita R. Gardner, Separate and Unequal: Fed-
eral Tough-On-Guns Program Targets Minority Communities For Selective Enforcement, 12
MICH. J. RACE & L. 305 (2007).
142 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) (quoting Smith v. Gougen, 415 U.S.
566, 575 (1974)).
143 461 U.S. at 358 n.7 (quoting United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875)). The
Reese language has been quoted in thirteen subsequent opinions, including most recently in
Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 425 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in judgment); see also Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of New England, 546 U.S. 320, 330
(2006).
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IV. FEDERAL COURTS ON WHEN A GUN CONTROL LAW
IS “LONGSTANDING”
In Heller, the Supreme Court stated that “nothing in our opinion should
be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of
firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of
firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or
laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of
arms.”144 A footnote adds: “We identify these presumptively lawful regula-
tory measures only as examples; our list does not purport to be exhaus-
tive.”145 Commentators and lower court judges have been kept busy trying to
discern the implications of this dictum.146 The Bloomberg laws are not
among the particular types of laws that the Court described as “presump-
tively lawful.” They do not involve the “commercial” sale of firearms, and
they extend to transfers which are not sales. Do the Bloomberg laws fit
within the general category of “longstanding”?
They do not. They are far outside the mainstream of traditional Ameri-
can gun control. This section summarizes lower court opinions of what
makes a gun control “longstanding.” Part V will examine such laws through
the nineteenth century. Part VI will do so for the first third of the twentieth
century. Although not middle-of-the-road, the Bloomberg laws do have
some analogues in historical practice.
What is “longstanding”? Several lower federal courts have engaged the
question in depth. The first appellate court to do so was the First Circuit in
United States v. Rene E., examining restrictions on transferring handguns to
juveniles.147 The First Circuit explained that it would “look to nineteenth-
century state laws imposing similar restrictions, as the Heller Court did.”148
States with such restrictions in the nineteenth century were Alabama (1856),
Tennessee (1856), Kentucky (1873), Indiana (1875), Georgia (1876), Penn-
sylvania (1881), Delaware (1881), and Kansas (1883).149 In addition, the
First Circuit pointed out two municipal ordinances, apparently enacted in the
144 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008).
145 Id. at 617 n.26.
146 For example, if a type of statute is “presumptively lawful,” is the presumption irrebut-
table? The better answer would be “no.” Say that a regulation requires that when the owner of
a retail gun store goes home for the night, the store must have security devices to prevent or
deter theft, and that guns must be locked up. This is an easy fit with the Heller dicta and can
speedily be held as lawful.
But suppose that the anti-theft rule is that every gun in the store must be disassembled before
the store closes at night. Or that the gun store may only be open for business five hours per
week. Or that only persons with a college degree may work in a gun store. All of these would
be “conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.” These laws are manifestly
oppressive, extreme, and unreasonable. They should be subject to heightened scrutiny, and
with heightened scrutiny applied, should be ruled unconstitutional.
147 United States v. Rene E., 583 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2009) (examining 18 U.S.C. § 922(x)(2)
(2006)).
148 Id. at 12.
149 Id. at 13–15. United States v. Rene E. cites the following cases:
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early part of the 1910s.150 The First Circuit then explained that it had evalu-
ated the federal statute “in light of the state laws of the nineteenth century
regulating juvenile access to handguns.”151 Taking into account the “narrow
scope” of the federal statute and its “important exceptions” for hunting,
self-defense in the home, and other activities, the statute was held
constitutional.152
The D.C. Circuit examined gun registration in Heller II.153 The court
explained that “a regulation that is ‘longstanding,’ which necessarily means
it has long been accepted by the public, is not likely to burden a constitu-
tional right.”154 So a “longstanding” law would be presumed not to violate
the Second Amendment, but “[a] plaintiff may rebut this presumption by
showing the regulation does have more than a de minimis effect upon his
right.”155
After the Supreme Court decided District of Columbia v. Heller in
2008, the D.C. Council had enacted a new gun control law. Among other
things, it had required registration of all firearms.156 The D.C. Circuit held
that long gun registration was “novel, not historic.”157 For handguns, “basic
registration” was longstanding; basic registration was giving the government
“a modicum of information about the registrant and his firearm.”158 In addi-
tion to basic registration for handguns, Washington, D.C., also had many
other requirements to register handguns or long guns. So the D.C. Circuit
remanded those issues.159 There, the government would have the opportunity
1850s: State v. Callicutt, 69 Tenn. 714 (1878) (upholding Tenn. Code § 4864, enacted by
ch. 81, 1855–56 Tenn. Acts 92 (Feb. 26, 1856)); Coleman v. State, 32 Ala. 581 (1858) (finding
that defendant’s conduct comes within the scope of an 1856 statute).
1870s: Spires v. Goldberg, 106 S.E. 585, 586 (Ga. 1921) (discussing a negligence per se action
based on violation of Ga. Penal Code § 350; referencing 1910 Code, but statute was first
enacted by 1876 Ga. Acts 112); Tankersly v. Commonwealth, 9 S.W. 702, 702 (Ky. 1888)
(dismissing on procedural grounds appeal of conviction on state statute; statute first appears in
1 Gen. Stats. of Ky. 359 (1873) (Crimes and Punishments, art. 29, § 1)); State v. Allen, 94 Ind.
441 (1884) (reversing the quashing of an indictment for violating section 1986 of the Indiana
Code, which had been enacted by 1875 Ind. Laws 59).
1880s: McMillen v. Steele, 119 A. 721 (Pa. 1923) (upholding 1881 statute); State v. Quail, 92
A. 859, 859 (Del. 1914) (quoting 1881 statute, originally enacted by An Act Providing for the
Punishment of Persons Carrying Concealed Deadly Weapons, ch. 548 § 1, 1881 Del. Laws 716
(Apr. 8, 1881)); Parman v. Lemmon, 244 P. 227, 228 (Kan. 1926) (negligence claim based on
violation of 1883 statute).
150 Rene E., 583 F.3d at 13, 15 (citing Biffer v. City of Chicago, 116 N.E. 182, 184–85
(Ill. 1917)) (upholding 1912 Chicago ordinance against issuing concealed handgun carry per-
mits to minors); Schmidt v. Capital Candy Co., 166 N.W. 502, 503 (Minn. 1918) (discussing a
St. Paul ordinance against giving certain arms and explosives to minors; sparklers held not to
be within scope; enactment date of ordinance not stated; case arose from conduct in 1915).
151 Rene E., 583 F.3d at 16.
152 Id. at 14, 16.
153 Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
154 Id. at 1252.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 1255.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 1253.
159 Id. at 1260, 1264.
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to prove them constitutional, using the ordinary rules of heightened
scrutiny.160
Regarding basic handgun registration, the D.C. Circuit found that it had
been “accepted for a century in diverse states and cities.”161 As historical
evidence, the court pointed to an Illinois statute from 1881, as well as four
state statutes from the 1910s, two from the 1920s, and a D.C. statute from
1932.162
The Seventh Circuit examined a ban on municipal target ranges in Ezell
v. Chicago.163 There were some old laws that regulated target ranges inside
of cities, but these were not prohibitions.164 There were other laws that were
municipal prohibitions, but they were for the purpose of fire prevention.165
The only historic laws that banned municipal target ranges and were not
about fire prevention were those enacted in Baltimore (1826) and Ohio
(1831). These two examples were not sufficient to exempt similar, modern-
day laws from heightened scrutiny, with the burden of proof on the
government.166
Two federal district courts have examined the meaning of “longstand-
ing” in detail. The court in Silvester v. Harris looked at California’s ten-day
waiting period on firearms purchases.167 Citing circuit court cases, Silvester
explained that the government bears the burden of proving that a gun law is
“longstanding.”168 The government failed to satisfy its burden because there
were no waiting period laws “around 1791 and 1868,” the dates when the
Second Amendment was enacted and then made binding on the states.169
Today, there are only ten states with waiting periods, so “they are not com-
mon now.”170 In 1923, California enacted a one-day wait for retail purchases
of handguns; but according to the court, that was not comparable to Califor-
nia’s current ten-day wait for all guns, including private sales.171 Thus, the
California waiting period would be subjected to heightened scrutiny.172
The court in Mance v. Holder found that the federal ban on interstate
handgun purchases, which was enacted in 1968, was not “longstanding.”173
160 Id.
161 Id. at 1254.
162 Id. (noting statutes in Georgia (1910), New York (1911), Oregon (1917), California
(1917), Michigan (1927), Territory of Hawaii (1927), District of Columbia (1932)).
163 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011).
164 Id. at 705–06.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 41 F. Supp. 3d 927 (E.D. Cal. 2014).




172 Applying this scrutiny, the court held the waiting period unconstitutional to the full
extent that the plaintiffs had requested: that it not apply to someone who has already passed the
background check, if that person already owns another gun.
173 74 F. Supp. 3d 795 (N.D. Tex. 2015).
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The first residency-related gun control law was West Virginia’s in 1909;174
however, “looking back only to 1909, today, omits more than half of
America’s history and belies the purpose of the inquiry.”175 In support of this
approach, the Mance court cited Heller’s statement that “[c]onstitutional
rights are enshrined with the scope they were understood to have when the
people adopted them, whether or not future legislatures or (yes) even future
judges think that scope too broad.”176
Although there are differences in the various ways in which lower
courts have defined “longstanding,” the results are consistent. Synthesizing
these cases, we can discern some general principles:
• The only laws that the lower courts have held to be long-standing
were initially enacted in the nineteenth century.
• Laws which first appeared in the nineteenth century can be but-
tressed by laws enacted in the early twentieth century.
• The latest time-wise that a court can go is debatable; the First Circuit
went as far back as 1918, while the D.C. Circuit went to 1932.
• The laws need not have been enacted everywhere; in two cases,
seven or eight states were sufficient.177
• Courts compare and contrast the breadth, stringency, and purpose of
older and modern laws. Narrow, older laws do not justify more re-
strictive, newer ones. A one-day retail wait for handguns does not
justify a ten-day wait for all firearms. Fire prevention laws do not
justify laws not involving fire prevention. Regulations do not justify
prohibition.
• Courts are cognizant of the historical tradition that handguns have
been regulated more rigorously than long guns. Older laws about
handguns cannot be used to justify modern laws about long guns.178
One other factor in whether something is “longstanding” is, necessa-
rily, whether the law is still “standing.” A law which was later repealed may
have had a long period when it was in effect, but nothing that has been
repealed can be said to be “longstanding.” After all, something that is
“longstanding” has two characteristics: being “long” and being “stand-
ing.”179 If a law has been repealed, it is not “standing.” Of course if a partic-
ular statute were replaced by something similar during a recodification, that
law could be “longstanding,” even if the current statutory language were
different from the original enactment.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 805.
176 Id. (citing Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634–35 (2008)).
177 Counting territories and the District of Columbia as “states” for this purpose.
178 This difference in treatment is empirically supported by the data in Justice Breyer’s
Heller dissent, showing handguns to be much more of a crime problem than long guns. See
554 U.S. at 695–98 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
179 See 1 SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1625 (1993) (“[ A] dj. Of long standing;
that has existed a long time, not recent.”).
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What kinds of historical laws would be analogous to the Bloomberg
laws? Laws that said that some sort of permission was needed before a per-
son could have a gun.180 Part V describes such laws from the nineteenth
century and earlier.
V. GUN POSSESSION PERMISSION SYSTEMS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
AND EARLIER
Until the early twentieth century, there were no laws that required that
individuals receive government permission before purchasing or borrowing
a firearm. However, there were many states that had permission require-
ments for slaves and free blacks. Not all states had permission systems.
Some states prohibited people of color from possessing arms. Other states
just left the issue to the master’s discretion.181 The next two sections describe
some of these government permission statutes. They are the only pre-twenti-
eth century analogues to the Bloomberg laws.
A. Colonial Period
The first law requiring government permission to possess a firearm was
enacted in the Colony of Virginia in 1619. Blacks and Indians who were
“not house-keepers, nor listed in the militia” were generally prohibited from
bearing arms.182 However, these Blacks and Indians living on frontier planta-
tions could possess arms if they were granted a license “to keep and use
guns, powder, and shot . . . .”183
Maryland mandated “[t]hat no Negro or other slave, within this Prov-
ince, shall be permitted to carry any Gun or any other offensive Weapon,
from off their Master’s Land, without Licence from their said
Master . . . .”184 South Carolina in 1740 required a master’s written permis-
sion for blacks to possess firearms.185 A 1755 Georgia statute, reenacted in
1768, followed the South Carolina model.186
180 The nineteenth century had bans on some arms (e.g., bowie knives). It also had restric-
tions on gun carrying in public (e.g., open, rather than concealed). See infra Part V.B–C.
181 Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-
Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309, 335–38 (1991).
182
WILLIAM WALLER HENING, 4 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL




75 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND 268 (William Hand Browne ed., 1885) (enacted 1715).
185 An Act for the better Ordering and Governing Negroes and other Slaves in this Prov-
ince, Act of May 10, 1740, no. 695, § 23, in 1731–1743 S.C. PUB. LAWS 163, 168–69. Blacks
could also possess arms while hunting under the supervision of a white person aged at least
sixteen years. Even with a license, carrying guns away from home was forbidden from sun-
down Saturday to sunrise Monday. Id.
186
THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 76–78, 117–18 (Allen D. Candler
ed., 1904).
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B. Early Republic Until the Civil War
In the new United States, several states enacted legislation requiring
that free blacks and/or slaves could possess firearms only if they were
granted a license. The first session of Mississippi’s territorial legislature de-
clared in 1799 that “[n]o negro or mulatto shall keep or carry any gun,
powder, shot, club or other weapon whatsoever, offensive or defensive.”187
However, “the commanding officers of legions” could grant free black
householders up to a twelve-months license to own and carry arms; slaves
could also receive a permit, “on application of their owners, shewing suffi-
cient cause . . . why such indulgence should be granted.”188 In 1822, a statu-
tory revision gave licensing powers to the justices of the peace (for slaves)
and to county courts (for free blacks) and did not limit the duration of the
licenses.189 The licensing system was replaced by a prohibition in 1852.190
Maryland’s 1806 statute forbade “any negro or mulatto within this state
to keep any dog, bitch, or gun.”191 However, a free “negro or mulatto” could
apply to a justice of the peace for a license, valid for no more than one year,
to keep one dog or to carry a gun.192 Also in 1806, Louisiana’s comprehen-
sive Black Code forbade all slave possession of firearms.193 The only excep-
tion to the code was for slaves hunting within “the limits of the plantation of
the owners” if the slaves were carrying written permission from their
owner.194 “[F]ree colored people, who carry arms” also had to carry “a
certificate of a justice of the peace, attesting their freedom.”195 If a free per-
son of color was not carrying the freedom certificate, the firearm was
forfeit.196
South Carolina’s 1819 firearms ban for slaves made exceptions if the
slave was “in the company and presence of some white person” or with “a
ticket or license in writing from his owner or overseer.”197 In 1827, Dela-
ware provided that no slave may carry an arm “without special permission
of his or her master or mistress.”198 In 1828 Florida allowed justices of the
187 A Law for the regulation of Slaves, 1799 Laws of the Miss. Terr. 112, 113 (Mar. 30,
1799). Slaves were also forbidden to keep dogs. Id. at 118.
188 Id.
189 An Act to reduce into one, the several acts, concerning Slaves, Free Negroes, and
Mulattoes, 1822 Miss. Laws 179, 181–83, §§ 10, 12 (June 18, 1822).
190 An Act to prohibit Magistrates from issuing license to negroes to carry and use fire-
arms, ch. 206, 1852 Miss. Laws 328 (Mar. 15, 1852).
191 An Act to restrain the evil practices from negroes keeping dogs, and to prohibit them
from carrying guns or offensive weapons, ch. 81, §§ 1–2, 1806 Md. Laws (Jan. 4, 1807).
192 Id.
193 Act of June 7, 1806, ch. 33, § 19, 1806 La. Acts 150, 160.
194 Act of June 7, 1806, ch. 33, § 20, 1806 La. Acts 150, 162–64.
195 Act of June 7, 1806, ch. 33, § 21, 1806 La. Acts 150, 164.
196 Act of June 7, 1806, ch. 33, §§ 19, 21, 1806 La. Acts 150, 160–62, 164.
197 An Act to provide for more effectual performance of Patrol Duty, 1819 S.C. Acts 29,
31.
198 An Act concerning certain crimes and offences committed by slaves, and for the secur-
ity of slaves properly demeaning themselves, ch. 50, § 8, 1827 Del. Laws 125, 125–26.
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peace to grant licenses to free “negroes” and “mulattoes” to carry fire arms,
but this was repealed in 1831.199
North Carolina in 1841 required that all free persons of color must have
an annual license from the Court of Pleas and Quarter Sessions in order to
own or carry firearms, swords, daggers, or bowie knives.200 The law was
challenged and upheld in the 1844 case State v. Newsom.201 Reversing the
trial court, the North Carolina Supreme Court explained that “free people of
color have been among us, as a separate and distinct class, requiring, from
necessity, in many cases, separate and distinct legislation.”202 It was up to
“the control of the County Court, giving them the power to say, in the exer-
cise of a sound discretion, who, of this class of persons, shall have a right to
the licence, or whether any shall.”203 Likewise, the Georgia Supreme Court
stated in 1848 that “[f]ree persons of color” were not citizens, and thus
“not entitled to bear arms.”204
The North Carolina and Georgia approach foreshadowed the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s 1856 decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford, which held that free
blacks were not citizens of the United States.205 Otherwise, warned the Court
majority, free blacks would be entitled to the “privileges and immunities of
citizens,” including the right to “carry arms wherever they went.”206
C. Reconstruction
After losing the Civil War, the former Confederate States grudgingly
accepted the abolition of de jure slavery, via the Thirteenth Amendment.
However, they aimed to keep the former slaves in a condition of de facto
servitude. The antebellum laws about slaves and free blacks were reenacted
as Black Codes—imposing many of the “incidents” of slavery on the freed-
men.207 Among these incidents were prohibitions on arms possession without
advance permission from the government.
Not all black codes had exemptions. For example, Georgia comprehensively outlawed firearms
possession by free persons of color. See An Act concerning free persons of Colour, their
Guardians, and Coloured Preachers, § 7, 1833 Ga. Acts 226, 228 (cited in McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 845 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
199 An Act Relating to crimes and misdemeanors committed by slaves, free negroes and
mulattoes, § 9, 1828 Fla. Laws 174, 177; Act of Jan. 12, 1828, § 9, 1827 Fla. Laws 97, 100;
An Act to amend an act relating to Crimes and Misdemeanors committed by slaves, free ne-
groes and mulattoes, 1831 Fla. Acts 30 (1831).
200 An Act to prevent Free Persons of Colour from carrying Fire-arms, ch. 30, 1840–41
N.C. Laws 61–62 (1841).
201 27 N.C. (5 Ired.) 250 (1844).
202 Id. at 252.
203 Id.
204 Cooper v. City of Savannah, 4 Ga. 68, 72 (1848) (upholding municipality’s special tax
on free persons of color who moved into the city).
205 See 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
206 Id. at 417.
207 Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment empowers Congress to abolish “all badges
and incidents of slavery.” Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 4 (1883).
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The first session of the Florida legislature following the Confederate
defeat provided that “it shall not be lawful for any negro, mulatto, or other
person of color, to own, use or keep in his possession or under his control,
any Bowie-knife, dirk, sword, fire-arms or ammunition of any kind.”208
There was an exception if a probate judge had issued a license, based on
“the recommendation of two respectable citizens of the county certifying the
peaceful and orderly character of the applicant.”209 The penalty was forfei-
ture of the weapon, plus thirty-nine lashes, or one hour in the pillory.210
Mississippi required a license from the county board of police.211 If the
defendant could not pay the fine, he would be “hired out” for labor to a
white person who paid the fine.212 Some other states, such as Alabama, sim-
ply prohibited arms possession by freedmen.213
Congress responded forcefully to the Black Codes. Much of the de-
feated South was under martial law, enforced by the Union Army, and so the
Second Freedmen’s Bureau Act (1866) ordered the President to extend “mil-
itary protection and have military jurisdiction” whenever “any of the civil
rights belonging to white persons, [including] full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of person and estate including the con-
stitutional right to bear arms . . . are refused or denied to negroes, mulattoes,
freedmen or any other persons, on account of race, color, or any previous
condition of slavery or involuntary servitude.”214 This was the first-ever con-
gressional enactment to protect the Second Amendment from state govern-
ment infringements.
Since the South would not be under martial law forever, a permanent,
national change was enacted: the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the foundational
statute for federal civil rights law, providing a legal cause of action for viola-
tions of any of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights.215 To provide the Civil
Rights Act with a secure constitutional foundation, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was passed by Congress in 1866 and ratified by the States in 1868.
Broadly speaking, the aim of the Reconstruction Congresses was to de-
molish the bases on which the “Slave Power” had rested,216 to undo the
208 An Act prescribing additional penalties for the commission of offenses against the
State and for other purposes, ch. 1,466, no. 3, § 12, 1865 Laws of Fla. 25 (1865).
209 Id. at 27.
210 Id. at 25.
211 An Act to punish certain Offences therein named, and for other purposes, ch. 23, § 1,
1865 Miss. Laws 165.
212 Ch. 23, § 5, 1865 Miss. Laws 165, 166–67.
213
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1838 (1866).
214 14 Stat. 173, 176–77 (1866) (emphasis added).
215 14 Stat. 27 (1866). For more on the author of the Civil Rights Act, see David B. Kopel,
Lyman Trumbull: Author of the Thirteenth Amendment, Author of the Civil Rights Act, and the
First Second Amendment Lawyer, 47 LOYOLA U. CHI. L.J. (forthcoming 2016), http://ssrn
.com/abstract=2564819 [http://perma.cc/K227-JMPR].
216 From the 1830s onward, anti-slavery advocates, especially Republicans, believed in
“[t]he idea of a southern ‘Slave Power’ that dominated national politics—with the goal of not
just preserving slavery in the South, but of nationalizing the institution.” Sandra L. Rierson,
The Thirteenth Amendment as a Model For Revolution, 35 VT. L. REV. 765, 801 (2011).
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effects of Dred Scott, and to guarantee full civil rights regardless of color. In
particular, this included protecting the Second Amendment rights of freed-
men. For example, Rep. Sidney Clarke (R-Kan.), speaking in support of the
Civil Rights Act, stated: “I find in the Constitution of the United States an
article which declares that ‘the right of the people to keep and bear arms
shall not be infringed.’ For myself, I shall insist that the reconstructed rebels
of Mississippi respect the Constitution in their local laws . . . .”217 The U.S.
Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in McDonald v. Chicago detailed the intent
of the Reconstruction Congresses to require states to obey the Second
Amendment.218 Justice Thomas’s concurrence cited several of the antebellum
and postbellum laws described above.219
In sum, the history of American gun control laws from the first days of
the Virginia colony, through the nineteenth century, reveals no example of
any law requiring that persons with full civil rights request government per-
mission before obtaining a firearm. To the contrary, such laws were exclu-
sively for persons who on account of their status were treated as inferiors in
society, not entitled to the rights of ordinary citizens. The Supreme Court’s
Heller decision took an expansive view of the original meaning of the Sec-
ond Amendment, looking backward to British and colonial antecedents and
forward as far as Reconstruction; the Court found an unchanged core of the
Amendment, guaranteeing the natural right to arms for self-defense.220
VI. THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY: HANDGUN PERMISSION
VS. NOTIFICATION
Unlike the nineteenth century, the twentieth century offers examples of
gun permission laws that were not expressly racial. Permission laws were
the exception, not the norm, in the early twentieth century. These laws were
mostly about handguns. In the states that enacted handgun purchasing laws,
there were two models. One was the New York “Sullivan Law” of 1911.221
The other was the less-restrictive alternative created by the United States
Revolver Association.222 The latter law developed into the Uniform Firearms
Act, adopted by the National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.223
Although this Article describes legislation through 1936, some of these
laws are past the cut-off dates for “longstanding” in federal decisions. The
cut-offs have been 1909 (too late in Mance),224 1918 (last citation in Rene
217
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1838 (1866).
218 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 769–78 (2010).
219 Id. at 844–50 (Thomas, J., concurring).
220 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577–619 (2008).
221 See Sullivan Dangerous Weapons Act, 1911 N.Y. Laws ch. 195, sec. 1, § 1897 (codi-
fied as amended at N.Y. Penal Law §§ 265.01(1), 265.20(a)(3)).
222 See infra Part VI.B.
223 See id.
224 See supra Part IV.
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E.),225 1923 (too late in Silvester), and 1932 (last citation in Heller II).226 This
article goes up to 1936, beyond the margin of “longstanding.”
As previously stated, the absence of longstanding historical predeces-
sors does not mean that the Bloomberg laws are necessarily unconstitu-
tional.227 The government still has the opportunity to meet its burden of
proving constitutionality through the ordinary process of heightened
scrutiny.228
Broad social concerns of the early twentieth century provided some of
the motivation for gun control laws, as well as for many other civil liberties
restrictions, including limits on public assemblies, labor organizing, and so
on. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, large waves of immi-
grants from Eastern and Southern Europe had flooded into America. The
percentage of the U.S. population that was foreign-born reached a high never
matched before or since. There was much hostility towards legal
immigrants.229
The Ku Klux Klan had been wiped out by President Ulysses Grant in
the early 1870s. However, the 1915 hit movie Birth of a Nation romantically
portrayed the Klan as having protected Southern white women from the dep-
redations of corrupt whites and bestial blacks.230 This resulted in the resur-
gence of the Klan that year, and soon the Klan was a major political force
throughout the United States, reaching a peak in the early and mid-1920s.231
Nativist hostility was aggravated by immigrant behavior: the immi-
grants were often involved in labor strikes or other unrest, and some aliens
were sympathetic to violent revolutionary communists, socialists, or
anarchists.
Fear of immigrants and revolution intensified after the 1919 Bolshevik
revolution brought Lenin into power in Russia, and several other revolutions
were attempted in Central and Eastern Europe. Fear of revolution led to the
first modern English laws on handguns and rifles, in 1921, and to similar
laws in the Dominions (such as New Zealand) and in the colonies.232 During




228 See, e.g., United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012); Moore v. Madi-
gan, 702 F.3d 933, 935 (7th Cir. 2012); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 702–03 (7th
Cir. 2011); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792 (10th Cir. 2010).
229 See generally Charles H. Watson, Need of Federal Legislation in Respect to Mob Vio-
lence in Cases of Lynching of Aliens, 25 YALE L.J. 561 (1916).
230 See SEYMOUR STERN, D.W. GRIFFITH’S 100TH ANNIVERSARY THE BIRTH OF A NATION
(2014). The movie was an adaptation of the novel THOMAS DIXON, THE CLANSMAN (1905).
231
THOMAS R. PEGRAM, ONE HUNDRED PERCENT AMERICAN: THE REBIRTH AND DECLINE
OF THE KU KLUX KLAN IN THE 1920s (2011).
232
DAVID B. KOPEL, THE SAMURAI, THE MOUNTIE AND THE COWBOY: SHOULD AMERICA
ADOPT THE GUN CONTROLS OF OTHER DEMOCRACIES? 73–74, 237–38 (1992).
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Mitchell Palmer rounded up and deported or imprisoned many alleged sub-
versives, often on flimsy or non-existent evidence.233
A third factor was national alcohol prohibition; it had been imposed by
the Volstead Act in 1919, after the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment
authorized Congress to pass such a law. The result was a boon to organized
crime. The organized criminals often shot each other, in disputes over terri-
tories and other issues. Understandably, this raised concerns about trying to
keep guns out of the hands of criminals.
An amicus brief by Mr. Bloomberg’s organization argued that the Colo-
rado version of his law was constitutional because it was longstanding.234
This Part of the Article examines all of the statutes discussed in that brief,
and others.
A. Before the Revolver Association Act
The following is a brief catalog of state gun laws in the years prior to
the enactment of the Revolver Association Act.
Delaware 1911. Retail handgun sellers were required to obtain a li-
cense. They could not sell a handgun “until the purchaser ha[d] been posi-
tively identified.”235 There was no need for government permission for the
sale. A 1919 revision demanded that the positive identification of handgun
buyers be made by “two freeholders,” whose names and addresses should
be recorded by the dealer. One of the freeholders could be a store employee
or the store owner. As in the 1911 enactment, no government permission
was needed.236
Colorado 1911–14. Colorado in the early twentieth century was the
scene of much conflict between the labor movement and the government.
Strikes were frequent, especially by miners, who were mostly recent immi-
grants from Southern and Eastern Europe. A 1911 statute required that per-
sons engaged “in the retail sale, rental or exchange” of handguns keep
records of the transactions, and that the record books be open to police in-
spection.237 The worst labor violence in the state’s history began in 1913 in
the southern Colorado coal fields; on Orthodox Easter Sunday in 1914, com-
pany goons machine-gunned and set ablaze a tent colony of striking miners
233 See generally Harlan Grant Cohen, The (Un)favorable Judgment of History: Deporta-
tion Hearings, the Palmer Raids, and the Meaning of History, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1431 (2003).
234 Brief for Everytown for Gun Safety as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellee
and Affirmance, Colorado Outfitters Ass’n v. John W. Hickenlooper, Nos. 14-1290, 14-1292
(10th Cir. Apr. 29, 2015), http://coloradoguncase.org/Bloomberg-amicus.pdf [http://perma.cc/
8GSS-8XYP].
235 An Act regulating the sale of deadly Weapons and providing a Special License there-
for, 26 Del. Laws 28, 28–29, §§ 1, 2, 4 (1911).
236 An Act to amend Chapter 6 of the Revised Code of the State of Delaware in relation to
the sale of deadly weapons, 30 Del. Laws 55, 55–56, § 1 (Apr. 10, 1919) (special sessions).
237 An Act relating to the sale, rental and giving away of firearms in the State of Colorado,
1911 Colo. Laws 408.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\53-1\HLL105.txt unknown Seq: 41 20-JAN-16 10:30
2016] Background Checks for Firearms Sales and Loans 343
and their families at Ludlow, Colorado.238 The legislative reaction to the
Ludlow Massacre was to give the governor authority to declare any or all of
Colorado to be in a state of riot or insurrection, allowing him to ban all
firearms sales, carrying, and use within the region.239 The statute was later
repealed.240
New York 1911. The Sullivan Act required a government permit for
handgun possession, purchases and carrying.241 The law was favored as a
means of cracking down on recent immigrants, particularly Italians.242
Oregon 1913. It was illegal “to sell at retail, barter, give away, or dis-
pose” of a handgun unless the purchaser had a permit from a municipal
judge, city recorder, or county judge.243 The applicant for a permit had to
present two affidavits attesting to the applicant’s “good moral character” and
signed by “reputable freeholders.”244 The permit-to-purchase law was re-
pealed in 1925, replaced by the Revolver Association Act.245
California 1917. “Every person in the business of selling, leasing or
otherwise transferring” handguns had to keep records of the business trans-
actions.246 On the day of the sale, a copy of the record had to be mailed to
local law enforcement.247
Montana 1918. Montana had a long history of labor unrest and xeno-
phobia that was aggravated by World War One. The 1918 extraordinary leg-
islative session enacted one of the broadest anti-sedition bills in American
history. Senate Bill 2 defined “Criminal syndicalism” as any advocacy of
238 See THOMAS G. ANDREWS, KILLING FOR COAL: AMERICA’S DEADLIEST LABOR WAR
(2010); SCOTT MARTELLE, BLOOD PASSION: THE LUDLOW MASSACRE AND CLASS WAR IN THE
AMERICAN (2008).
239 An Act in Relation to Fire Arms and Ammunition, ch. 2, 1914 Colo. Laws 4.
240 The repeal left in place only one part of the statute: the section that said the statute
should not be construed to transgress the state constitutional right to arms. Today the statute
reads, in its entirety, “[n]othing in this part 2 shall be construed so as to call in question the
right of any person to keep and bear arms in the defense of his home, person, or property or in
aid of the civil power when thereto legally summoned.” C.R.S. § 24-20-203; An Act Concern-
ing declarations of a state of emergency, ch. 343, 2003 Colo. Laws 2176, 2176-72.
241 Sullivan Dangerous Weapons Act, 1911 N.Y. Laws ch. 195, sec. 1, § 1897 (codified as
amended at N.Y. Penal Law §§ 265.01(1), 265.20(a)(3)).
242 See e.g., Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, “Never intended to be applied to
the white population”: Firearms regulation and racial disparity—The redeemed south’s legacy
to a national jurisprudence?, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1307, 1334 (1995) (“[T]he Sullivan Law
was aimed at New York City, where the large foreign born population was deemed peculiarly
susceptible and perhaps inclined to vice and crime.”); Editorial, Concealed Pistols, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 27, 1905), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9C03E4D8163DE733
A25754C2A9679C946497D6CF [http://perma.cc/XMJ8-9GVB] (touting a proposal similar to
the Sullivan Act as “corrective and salutary in a city filled with immigrants and evil communi-
cations, floating from the shores of Italy and Austria-Hungary”).
243 An Act Forbidding the sale, barter, giving away, disposal of or display for sale of
pocket pistols and revolvers, and fixing a penalty for violation thereof, ch. 256, § 1, 1913 Or.
Laws 497.
244 Ch. 256, § 2, 1913 Or. Laws 497.
245 See An Act to control the possession, sale and use of pistols and revolvers, to provide
penalties, ch. 260, 1925 Or. Laws 468.
246 Act of Jul. 27, 1917, ch. 145, § 7, 1917 Cal. Laws 221, 222–23.
247 Ch. 145, § 7, 1917 Cal. Laws 221, 223.
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“unlawful acts or method . . . as a means of accomplishing or effecting
industrial or political ends.”248 Straightforwardly, it would have made the
advocacy of tactics later used in the Civil Rights Movement, such as lunch
counter sit-ins, or Rosa Parks refusing to yield her bus seat, into a felony.
While the civil disobedience of the Civil Rights Movement involved com-
mitting some small misdemeanors (such as trespass at lunch counters), the
Montana law made mere advocacy of such activities a felony. Eventually,
the U.S. Supreme Court would begin to hold such statutes to be violations of
the First Amendment, starting with DeJonge v. Oregon in 1937.249
Montana’s 1918 Senate Bill 4 required a permit for the purchase of a
firearm from a seller outside of Montana.250 Further, all Montanans were
supposed to register with their county sheriff all of their “fire arms and
weapons.”251 If the firearm was sold or transferred to another person, a new
registration record had to be submitted.252 Firearms dealers (including pawn-
brokers and the like) had to keep records of all firearms sales; the dealer
records were open to inspection, but did not have to be sent to the govern-
ment.253 Senate Bill 4 was repealed in its entirety in the 1921 legislative
session.254
North Carolina 1919. A new law, which as amended is still in effect,
made it “unlawful for any person, firm or corporation . . . to sell, give away
or dispose of . . . any pistol, so-called pump gun,255 bowie knife, dirk, dagger
or metallic knucks” without a permit from the clerk of the superior courts.256
Dealers (but not private sellers) had to keep records. The statute was later
amended to exempt purchases by persons who have a concealed handgun
carry permit.257 Another amendment eliminated the “so-called pump gun”
from coverage.258 North Carolina was the only U.S. jurisdiction ever to have
special restrictions on pump action guns. Taxpayers who owned the afore-
said items had to list them along with “other personal property for taxes.”259
248 Act of Feb. 21, 1918, ch. 7, 1918 Mont. Laws 14, 14–15.
249 DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
250 Act of Feb. 20, 1918, ch. 2, § 3, 1918 Mont. Laws 6 (Feb. 20, 1918).
251 Id. §§ 1–2.
252 Id. § 1.
253 Id. §§ 5–6.
254 An Act Relating to the Codification and General Revision of the Laws of Montana,
ch. 109, § 5, 1921 Mont. Laws 112, 114 (1921).
255 In a pump action rifle or shotgun, the user ejects the used, empty shell casing, and
loads a fresh round into the firing chamber, by pulling and then pushing a pump located under-
neath the barrel. Among the types of long guns not covered by the North Carolina statute
would be semi-automatic action, lever action, slide action, and double-barreled or single shot
guns.
256 An Act to Regulate the Sale of Concealed Weapons in North Carolina, ch. 197, § 1,
1919 N.C. Sess. Laws, 397, 397 (1919).
257
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-402(a) (2011).
258 An Act to Require That Weapons Permits Be Obtained from the County of Residence
of the Purchaser, ch. 894, § 1, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 1230, 1230 (1979).
259 An Act to Regulate The Sale Of Concealed Weapons in North Carolina, ch. 197, § 6,
1919 N.C. Laws 397, 399 (1919).
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The permit form made it clear that the law was about permanent dispo-
sitions, not temporary loans; the form was for a person to obtain permission
“to purchase one pistol (or) ________ from any person, firm, or corporation
authorized to dispose of the same.”260 Although the statutory language did
not have exceptions, a 1982 Attorney General Opinion stated that pawn-
shops did not need a permit in order to take in handguns, and that handgun
dealers did not require a permit in order to acquire inventory.261
Missouri 1921. Other than the 17th–19th century statutes aimed at
blacks, this was the first American statute whose literal text could be con-
strued to cover non-commercial firearms loans. “No person . . . shall directly
or indirectly buy, sell, borrow, loan, give away, trade, barter, deliver or re-
ceive” any handgun to a person without a permit.262 The statute would be
repealed in 2007.263
Although the statute could be read to apply to all loans, it was con-
strued by the Missouri judiciary and attorney general to only apply to hand-
gun transfers involving a change in title or right of possession. According to
the Missouri Court of Appeals, a “literal construction . . . would reach an
absurd and unreasonable result.”264 The court favored “the manifest intent”
260 Id. § 2(blank space in original); see also THOMAS FAULK, FIREARMS LAWS OF NORTH
CAROLINA 140 (2006) (“The statute does not seem to apply to loaned or rented firearms.”
(emphasis in original)).
261 51 N.C. Op. Att’y Gen. 71 (1982).
262 An Act to provide for the public safety by requiring each pistol, revolver, or other
firearm of a size which may be concealed upon the person, to be stamped with the description
of the same, and a record of all sales thereof to be kept by all dealers therein, and regulating
the buying, selling, borrowing, loaning, giving away, trading, bartering, delivering or receiving
of such weapons, and prescribing punishments for the violation thereof, and with an emer-
gency clause, § 2, 1921 Mo. Laws 691, 692 (Apr. 7, 1921).
263 One article suggested that the repeal resulted in an increase in homicides and in illegal
gun trafficking. See generally Daniel Webster, Cassandra Kercher Crifasi & Jon S. Vernick,
Effects of the Repeal of Missouri’s Handgun Purchaser Licensing Law on Homicides, 91 J.
URB. HEALTH 293 (2014). The data tables on which the article is based contain hundreds of
errors, due to the erroneous transposition of some data columns. See Transcript of Record at
1282–86, Colorado Outfitters Ass’n v. Hickenlooper, 24 F. Supp. 3d 1050 (D. Colo. 2014),
http://coloradoguncase.org/trial%20transcripts/ap072014outfitters6.pdf [http://perma.cc/J3PX-
NNLW]. Second, the trafficking findings are based on firearms trace data from the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, and the use of such data is contrary to a federal
government warning that the data are inappropriate for drawing conclusions such as those
drawn by the article:
Law enforcement agencies may request firearms traces for any reason. . . . The fire-
arms selected do not constitute a random sample and should not be considered repre-
sentative of the larger universe of all firearms used by criminals, or any subset of
that universe. Firearms are normally traced to the first retail seller, and sources re-
ported for firearms traced do not necessarily represent the sources or methods by
which firearms in general are acquired for use in crime.
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-6, § 514
(2013).
264 Taylor v. McNeal, 523 S.W.2d 148, 151 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (noting that “[m]ere
seizure by the police, which involves only temporary custody, does not change title nor right
of possession to the property seized;” statute does not apply to police seizures of handguns,
nor to the return of seized handguns, nor to giving a handgun to a gunsmith and later picking it
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of the legislature over a “literal construction,” because “[c]onstruction of
statutes should avoid unjust, unreasonable, absurd or confiscatory results.”265
A 2003 treatise on Missouri firearms law observed that “very few persons
have been charged with this obscure crime.”266
One reason that the statute was eventually repealed was frequent abuse
by various sheriffs’ offices. Many demanded advance information about the
specific handgun to be purchased, and about the seller, although the statute
required none of this information; in fact, requiring the information was a
misdemeanor.267 St. Louis for many years demanded that married women
provide a permission slip from their husbands, and that some applicants (es-
pecially Blacks) provide letters of recommendation.268 St. Louis also insisted
that the permittee provide a reason for acquiring the handgun, and self-de-
fense was not accepted as a legitimate reason.269
Arkansas 1923. This statute required that all present and future handgun
owners register their handguns with the county clerk. Handgun owners had
to apply for an ownership permit, which needed be renewed annually.270 Ac-
cording to the A.B.A. Journal, “[t]his law was found so impracticable in
enforcement” that it was repealed in 1925.271 At a meeting of the National
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, a commissioner from Arkansas ex-
plained that the act “proved a complete failure; that scarcely anybody regis-
tered his pistols and it was realized that it worked an injustice to the few who
did so.”272
B. The First Uniform Firearms Act
State laws requiring a permit to purchase or a permit to possess a hand-
gun were a rarity as of the early 1920s. North Carolina also required a permit
up from the gunsmith); see also Mo. Op. Att’y Gen. 174–96 (1996) (explaining that the statute
does not apply to redeeming one’s handgun from a pawnbroker); Mo. Op. Att’y Gen. 137
(1964) (explaining that if coroner came into possession of decedent’s handguns, he can give
them to the estate administrator or executor); cf. Mo. Op. Att’y Gen. 99 (1956) (qualifying that
statute does cover transfer of handguns by inheritance or bequest, which is a permanent trans-
fer of title).
265 Taylor, 523 S.W.2d at 151–52.
266
KEVIN L. JAMIESON, MISSOURI WEAPONS AND SELF-DEFENSE LAW 92 (2003). The one
reported prosecution is State v. Yates, 982 S.W.2d 767 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (discussing how
Jackson loaned Yates his handgun, ostensibly for target practice; Yates was investigated after
he open-carried the handgun at a convenience store).
267
JAMIESON, supra note 266, at 93. R
268 Id.
269 Id.
270 An Act to regulate the Ownership of Pistols and Revolvers, Act 430, 1923 Ark. Acts
379 (1923).
271 An Act to Repeal Act No 430, of the General Acts of Arkansas of 1923, Act 351, 1925
Ark. Acts 1047 (1925); Imlay, supra note 70, at 768. R
272 Third Report of the Committee on a Uniform Act to Regulate the Sale and Possession
of Firearms, in HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING DENVER, COLORADO
JULY 6–12, 1926, at 571, 572 (1926).
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for long guns, namely the “so-called pump gun.”273 In 1922, the leaders of
the United States Revolver Association decided that the permitting system
should not be allowed to spread.274 So they drafted their own model gun
control law and began promoting it around the country.275 They won imme-
diate success, beginning in 1923.276 The Revolver Association presented its
model to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, and in 1926 the Revolver Association Act (also called the Uniform
Revolver Act) became the Uniform Firearms Act.277 The Commissioners ex-
plained that they used the Revolver Act because of its good draftsmanship,
and because it had already been adopted in several states.278
The lead drafter of the Revolver Association Act was Karl T. Frederick,
who was chosen as a special consultant by the National Conference of Com-
missioners.279 Frederick was a New York City lawyer and a Harvard Law
School graduate.280 He won three gold medals in pistol at the 1920 Summer
Olympics, held in Antwerp, Belgium.281
Frederick and his colleagues loathed the Sullivan Act, the 1911 New
York law requiring a permit to purchase or possess a handgun. As described
by Frederick, the act was ignored in rural New York; in most of the rest of
the state, it was applied fairly, with local judges issuing the permits.282 But in
New York City, the police department was in charge of the permits.283 The
police commissioners took the view that citizens should not have handguns,
and so no matter the reason a New York City applicant might give for want-
ing a handgun (e.g., target shooting, self-defense), the applicant would be
told that the reason was not good enough.284 A determined applicant might
make his way through the police gauntlet; even then, a person would not be
allowed to possess more than one handgun.285
In 1927, NRA members elected Frederick to the NRA Board of Direc-
tors. He served as NRA President in 1934–35, and remained active with the
NRA and with handgun competition for the rest of his life.286
273 An Act to Regulate The Sale Of Concealed Weapons in North Carolina, ch. 197, § 1,
1919 N.C. Laws 397, 397 (1919).
274
KARL T. FREDERICK, PISTOL LAW (1964). The book is based on a series of articles that
Frederick wrote for the NRA magazine The American Rifleman in 1930–31.
275 Id.
276 See infra Part VI.C.
277 Imlay, supra note 70, at 767. R
278 Third Report, supra note 272, at 571–72. R
279 Id.
280
FREDERICK, supra note 274. R
281 He won the individual medal in fifty-meter free pistol, plus team medals in thirty-meter









FREDERICK, supra note 274. R
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Because of the influence of the Uniform Firearms Act, it is worthwhile
to summarize the provisions, as adopted by the National Commissioners in
1926. The Act applies to pistols and revolvers, which means any firearm
with a barrel less than twelve inches.287 For simplicity’s sake, this Article
generally refers to “handguns” rather than to “pistols or revolvers.” Key
provisions were:
• Extra punishment for use of a handgun in a violent crime.288
• In a prosecution for a violent crime, the defendant’s carrying of a
handgun without a carry permit was prima facie evidence of intent to
use the handgun in the crime.289
• Persons convicted of a crime of violence could not possess a
handgun.290
• No restrictions on open carrying of guns, but a permit was required
for carrying a concealed handgun in public places.291
• Regarding minors, “No person shall sell, barter, hire, lend, or give
any pistol or revolver to any person under the age of eighteen
years.”292
• Regarding adults, no one could transfer, even by lending, a firearm to
a person whom “he has reasonable cause to believe has been con-
victed of a crime of violence.”293
The sales controls, which are the topic most relevant to this Article,
were set forth in sections nine to eleven. Handgun retailers had to have li-
censes.294 Local governments were to grant the retail handgun licenses;
mandatory conditions on the license included that the handgun be delivered
unloaded and securely wrapped.295
No “seller” could deliver a pistol or revolver on the day of purchase.
The purchaser had to sign a form affirming that he has not been convicted of
a crime of violence, and providing his “name, address, occupation, color,
287 Uniform Firearms Act § 1 (1926).
288 Id. § 2.
289 Id. § 3.
290 Id. § 4.
291 Id. § 5. No permit was needed for concealed carry in one’s home, lands, or place of
business. Id. Some persons, such as military and law enforcement, did not need a permit. Id.
§ 6. There was no need for a carry permit to transport pistols and revolvers as merchandise
(e.g., wholesaler to retailer), nor to take unloaded pistols and revolvers to and from gun stores,
firearms repair shops, nor while moving one’s abode or place of business.
How does one obtain a concealed handgun carry permit? The relevant local officials “shall”
issue a carry license valid for up to one year to an applicant who has good reason to fear injury
to his person or property, “or has any other proper reason for carrying a pistol or revolver.” Id.
§ 7. The applicant must be “a suitable person to be so licensed.” Id. § 7. As adopted by states,
the “shall” was often changed to “may.” Beginning in the late 1980s, there has been a na-
tional trend to replace “may issue” with “shall issue.” Today, only a few states have not
adopted this model. Kopel, supra note 75, at 1602, 1611. R
292 Uniform Firearms Act § 8 (1926).
293 Id. § 9.
294 Id. § 10.
295 Id. § 11.
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and place of birth,” plus the make, model, and serial number of the hand-
gun.296 Within seven days, the seller had to forward copies to the Secretary
of State and to local law enforcement.297
The Uniform Firearms Act (“UFA”) superseded “any local law or ordi-
nance.”298 This is an early version of the preemption laws now in effect in
every state (except Hawaii), which prohibit or limit local gun control laws
more restrictive than the state law.299
In choosing to follow the Revolver Association Act, the Commissioners
had followed “the almost universal system of regulation which has prevailed
in the various states”: a license was required in order to carry a concealed
pistol; no license was required to purchase or possess.300 As the National
Commissioners explained, “the license to purchase would not prevent
criminals from obtaining arms but would make it difficult for law-abiding
citizens to obtain arms for their protection.”301 Detailing the UFA in an arti-
cle for the A.B.A. Journal, Commissioner Charles Imlay elaborated on the
rejection of requiring permits to purchase or possess a firearm: such laws
“would no doubt be followed by an era of pistol bootlegging similar to the
liquor bootlegging which followed Prohibition.”302 The criminal records of
New York “amply demonstrate” the failure of the Sullivan Act, which re-
quired permits to purchase and possess.303
Rather, Imlay explained, “one of the best safeguards against crime is
consciousness on the part of the criminal that the householder possesses
arms.”304 Requiring a permit to purchase “might render it impossible for a
citizen to obtain a pistol when he might need it the most; the requirement of
a license to possess would forbid his borrowing a pistol from a neighbor at
the moment of a pressing emergency. He would be unarmed as against a
criminal in defiance of the law.”305 Thus, under the Uniform Firearms Act,
“A seller may not transfer a weapon on the day of purchase,” but this does
296 Id. § 10. It was illegal to supply false information on the handgun form, or on the
concealed carry permit application. Id. § 12. It was illegal to obliterate the serial number on a
handgun. Id. § 13.
297 Id. § 10.
298 Id. § 16.
299 Besides Frederick’s articles, the main sources about the 1926 Uniform Firearms Act are
the 1926 report of the National Commissioners explaining their adoption of the model law,
plus an article that year in the A.B.A. Journal on the Uniform Firearms Act, which was also
adopted by the American Bar Association in 1926. The article was written by Charles V.
Imlay, a D.C. attorney who was a National Commissioner, and who had served on the commit-
tee that drafted the Uniform Firearms Act. See Imlay, supra note 70; see also National Fire- R
arms Act: Hearings on H.R. 9066 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 73d Cong.
67–68 (1934); HANDBOOK OF THE NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS AND PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE FORTIETH ANNUAL CONF. 533, 568–69 (1930).
300 Imlay, supra note 70, at 768. R
301 Third Report, supra note 272, at 574. R
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“not forbid the lending of a weapon by one citizen to another in case of
emergency.”306
Some thought that the Revolver Association Act went too far. Indeed,
Arizona Governor George W. P. Hunt307 vetoed it as an invasion of personal
liberties.308
C. Through 1929
To the extent that laws from the 1920s provide information about what
types of gun controls are “longstanding,” the 1920s offer much support for
laws that require handgun dealer licensing and recordkeeping. Five of the
then-forty-eight states added laws requiring a permit for retail handgun
purchases, and one state repealed such a law. Three of the five permit-to-
purchase states also required a permit for private purchases. Two of them
applied this to private loans. Three other states required that private persons
not sell or transfer handguns to strangers. Long guns remained almost en-
tirely out of the picture for sales or transfer laws. This period also demon-
strates the general preference for the UFA over the Sullivan Act, in the
minority of states which enacted gun control laws.
North Dakota 1923. This was the first law based on the Revolver Asso-
ciation Act.309 Going further than the Model Act, North Dakota banned
handguns not just for felons, but also for every “unnaturalized foreign-born
person.”310
For handgun sales recordkeeping, North Dakota required the “national-
ity” of the purchaser.311 Since only sales to American citizens were allowed,
the recordkeeping may have aimed to track Americans of supposedly suspi-
cious heritage (e.g., Italian-Americans, Russian-Americans).
Post-Heller, courts have ruled that state laws imposing special gun re-
strictions on legal resident aliens are unconstitutional; all courts to address
the issue are unanimous.312 These are easy cases under modern Supreme
306 Id. at 769.
307 A Democrat and progressive, Hunt was Arizona’s first Governor, and served a total of
seven two-year terms, not all contiguous. He supported “organized labor, women’s suffrage,
secret ballots, income tax, free silver coinage, and compulsory education. He was also an
opponent of capital punishment . . . .” George W. P. Hunt: First Governor of Arizona and
Father of Arizona State Museum, ARIZ. ST. MUSEUM, http://www.statemuseum.arizona.edu/
about/history/hunt—george_w_p.shtml [http://perma.cc/95A7-CHHG].
308 Veto Messages, at 11–16, Mar. 19, 1927 (cited in Charles V. Imlay, Uniform Firearms
Act Reaffirmed, 16 A.B.A. J. 799, 801 (1930)).
309 An Act To Control the Possession, sale, and use of pistols and revolvers, to provide
penalties, and for other purposes, ch. 266 § 5, 1923 N.D. Laws 379, 380.
310 Id.
311 § 10, 1923 N.D. Laws at 381–82.
312 See supra Part IV.
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Court doctrine prohibiting almost all forms of state discrimination against
legal aliens.313
Again adding language beyond the Model Act, North Dakota restricted
private handgun sales, albeit only between strangers: “When neither party
holds a dealer’s license, no person shall sell or otherwise transfer a pistol or
revolver to any person not personally known to him.”314
California 1923. Like North Dakota, California banned handgun pos-
session by unnaturalized aliens.315 For retail handgun purchases, the dealer
must mail a notice to the local police on the day of the sale.316 The buyer
may pick up the handgun the day after the sale.317
As in prior California law, to carry a concealed handgun, a person
needed a permit issued by the county sheriff. No permit was needed when
handguns were “carried openly in a belt holster.”318
Although the Revolver Association Act was written by people who
were aiming to respect constitutional rights, not every provision in it should
automatically be considered constitutional. For example, one provision of
the Revolver Association Act enacted by California in 1923 is currently sub-
ject to a legal challenge: the mandate that handgun retailers may not display
handguns where they “can readily be seen from outside.”319 Thus far, the
U.S. District Court has determined that the display law is very likely uncon-
stitutional based on current Supreme Court precedents about commercial
speech; however, the court declined to issue a preliminary injunction, so as
not to disturb the status quo.320
313 Except in a few matters such as voting rights or some types of government employ-
ment. One of the foundational cases of the Court’s modern doctrine on the issue was Takahashi
v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (holding that California may not prohibit legal
resident aliens from acquiring commercial fishing licenses).
The modern doctrine is different from the early twentieth century. In 1914, the Supreme Court
ruled that states could ban long gun possession by aliens, because the gun ban helped to pre-
serve game for the citizens. There was no Fourteenth Amendment violation because “[t]he
prohibition does not extend to weapons such as pistols that may be supposed to be needed
occasionally for self-defense.” Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 143 (1914). North Da-
kota did the opposite, by banning handguns for aliens, while imposing no restrictions on aliens’
long guns. Sometimes, laws against firearms possession by legal aliens were ruled unconstitu-
tional on the basis of the state constitutional right to arms provisions. See People v. Zerillo,
219 Mich. 635 (1922); People v. Nakamura, 62 P.2d 246 (Colo. 1936).
314 § 10, 1923 N.D. Laws at 381–82.
315 An act to control and regulate the possession, sale and use of pistols, revolvers and
other firearms capable of being concealed upon the person [. . .], ch. 339, § 2, 1923 Cal. Stat.
695, 695–96.
316 § 9, 1923 Cal. Stat. at 699.
317 §§ 10–11, 1923 Cal. Stat. at 701.
318 § 5, 1923 Cal. Stat. at 697. There was a similar exemption for “knives which are
carried openly in sheaths suspended from the waist of the wearer.” Id.
319 § 11, 1923 Cal. Stat. at 701.
320 Order, Tracy Rifle & Pistol LLC. v. Harris, No. 14-02626 (E.D. Cal., July 16, 2015).
The display ban is currently codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 26820.
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New Hampshire 1923. Following the Revolver Association Act, hand-
gun dealers needed to obtain a license and keep records of sales. Within one
week after a sale, a copy of the record of sale had to be sent to local officials.
A permit to purchase a handgun was required only if the buyer were a
convicted felon or an unnaturalized alien.321 New Hampshire did not follow
California and North Dakota in prohibiting handgun possession by such per-
sons entirely. There was no waiting period for handgun sales. For citizens
who were not convicted felons, there was no requirement for prior authoriza-
tion for handgun purchases.
Connecticut 1923. A police permit was required for retail handgun
purchases.322 All transfers of handguns to aliens by anyone were banned.323
Oregon 1925. The 1913 requirement for a permit to purchase a retail
handgun was abolished. Instead, the new law affirmed that persons needed
“no permit or license to purchase, own, possess or keep” a handgun in their
residence or place of business. As the National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws pointed out, Oregon was rejecting its 1913 stat-
ute, which had been similar to New York’s Sullivan Act; Oregon was
replacing it with the Revolver Association Act.324
Handgun dealers were required to keep records of their sales, and to
mail sales records to the municipal police department or the county clerk on
the evening of the sale. The handgun could be delivered to the customer the
next day.
“When neither party to the transaction holds a dealers’ license, no per-
son shall sell or otherwise transfer” a handgun to someone “who is not per-
sonally known to the vendor.”325 This was similar to North Dakota law.
Like North Dakota and California, Oregon outlawed handguns for
aliens. Like California, Oregon specified that a concealed handgun carry
permit was not needed for handguns “carried openly in a belt holster.”326
Since a holster does cover part of a firearm, the language made it clear that
holsters were considered to be a means of open carry, not of concealed carry.
Indiana 1925. A person may not transfer a handgun “to a person he has
reasonable cause to believe is not a citizen.”327 There was a one-day waiting
period for retail handgun sales, and dealers had to keep records. The dealer
321 An Act to Control the Possession, Sale, and Use of Pistols and Revolvers, ch. 118,
§§ 9–10, 1923 N.H. Laws 138, 139–40.
322 An Act Concerning the Possession, Sale and Use of Pistols and Revolvers, ch. 252,
§ 7, 1923 Conn. Pub. Acts 3707, 3708–09.
323 Id.
324 Third Report, supra note 272, at 572; An Act to control the possession, sale and use of R
pistols and revolvers, to provide penalties, ch. 260, 1925 Or. Laws 468.
325 § 10, 1925 Or. Laws at 473.
326 § 5, 1925 Or. Laws at 469–70.
327 An Act to regulate and control the possession, sale and use of pistols and revolvers in
the State of Indiana, to provide penalties, and for other purposes, ch. 207, 1925 Ind. Acts 495,
497–98.
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was required to transmit the record of sale to the clerk of the county circuit
court within one week of the sale.
Indiana followed the North Dakota and Oregon language allowing pri-
vate handgun sale or transfer only between people who personally knew
each other.
Michigan 1925. Michigan partly followed the Revolver Association
Act, but went considerably further. To begin with, the Michigan statute also
applied to rifles or shotguns with a total length under thirty inches.328 This
was a predecessor of the National Firearms Act of 1934, which applies to
very short rifles or shotguns, and not to the vast majority of rifles and
shotguns.329
The Michigan Act was repealed entirely in 1927. The 1925 law was
troubled from the start, due to an unusual provision: all persons currently in
possession of handguns, short rifles, or short shotguns had to register them
with local law enforcement.330 The National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws called the Michigan registration provision “radical”
and noted the failure of a similar law in Arkansas.331 A 1926 issue of the
A.B.A. Journal reported that “the registration feature had upon last informa-
tion not yet been put into effect, because of technical difficulties.”332
Michigan 1927. The 1927 repeal333 appears somewhat cynical. In the
replacement statute, the 1925 registration requirement was labeled as a
“safety inspection.” Current owners, as well as persons later “coming into
possession” of handguns or short rifles/shotguns had to present the weapon
to law enforcement, for a safety inspection on which records would be
kept.334
For purchases, a person needed a license issued by local law enforce-
ment. The license was valid for ten days. “Purchaser” was defined to in-
clude someone “who receives a pistol by purchase, gift, or loan.”335 The
actions of the Michigan legislature in 1925 and 1927 may have been partly
in response to the Michigan Supreme Court’s 1922 decision People v.
Zerillo: the court struck down a near-prohibitory licensing law against arms
possession by non-citizens, as violating the State Constitution right to
arms.336 Perhaps the registration, inspections, and permits were attempts to
find another means of controlling arms among the foreign-born.
The “safety inspection” requirement was later repealed.337 The permit-
to-purchase requirement was also eventually loosened, so that no permit was
328 Act no. 313, § 1, 1925 Mich. Pub. Acts 473, 473.
329 National Firearms Act, Pub. L. No. 73-474, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934).
330 § 11, 1925 Mich. Pub. Acts 473, 475.
331 Third Report, supra note 272, at 572. R
332 Imlay, supra note 70, at 768. R
333 § 17, 1927 Mich. Pub. Acts 887, 893 (1927).
334 Id. § 8, at 891.
335 Id. §§ 1–2, at 887–88.
336 People v. Zerillo, 219 Mich. 635 (1922).
337 S.B. 370, H.Bs. 4490 & 4491 (2008).
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needed for persons who already had a concealed carry license.338 Eventually,
the permit-to-purchase requirement was eliminated for retail transactions;
the modern statute still requires a permit to purchase for private
transactions.339
Massachusetts 1926. Since 1922, handgun dealers had been required to
keep records of sale and deliver them to the police once a week.340 Starting
in 1926, retail handgun purchasers needed a permit, except that persons with
a concealed carry permit did not. A handgun could not be delivered on the
day of sale, except to a person with a carry permit.341 In 1927, the law was
amended so that it also covered machine guns.342
Massachusetts law forbade the issuance of carry permits to aliens. This
was later held to be unconstitutional, as a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.343
New Jersey 1927. Firearms dealers (not only handgun dealers) needed a
license.344 A retailer could sell handguns only to persons who had a permit to
purchase, or who had a concealed carry permit. There was a seven-day wait-
ing period.345 For private sales of handguns, the purchaser also needed a per-
mit.346 The requirements for handguns also applied to long guns less than
twenty-six inches long.347
In exempting persons with handgun carry permits, Massachusetts and
New Jersey recognized that the issuance of a carry permit constituted a po-
lice determination that a person was suitable to possess a handgun. Accord-
ingly, restrictions on that person’s handgun acquisitions would be pointlessly
burdensome.
Hawaii 1927. Although Hawaii adopted language from the UFA, Ha-
waii went much further. A license was required to possess or carry a hand-
gun; people who already owned handguns and kept them at their home or
place of business did not need to obtain a license.348 The permit requirement
338 2000 Mich. Pub. Acts 381.
339 2012 Mich. Pub. Acts 377.
340 An Act relative to the sale, rental, leasing, and carrying of certain firearms, ch. 485,
1922 Mass. Acts 560 (1922); An Act relative to the sale, rental, leasing, and carrying of certain
firearms, ch. 284, 1925 Mass. Acts 323 (1925).
341 An Act regulating the sale, rental and leasing of certain firearms, and prohibiting loans
of money thereon, ch. 395, § 1, 1926 Mass. Acts 485, 485–86 (1926).
342 An Act relative to machine guns and other firearms, ch. 326, § 1, 1927 Mass. Acts 413,
413 (1927).
343 Fletcher v. Haas, 851 F. Supp. 2d 287 (D. Mass. 2012).
344 A Further Supplement to an Act entitled “An Act for the Punishment of Crimes”
(Revision of 1898), approved June fourteenth, one thousand eight hundred and ninety eight,
ch. 321, § 6, 1927 N.J. Laws 742, 744 (1927).
The bill’s title was a reference of New Jersey’s comprehensive 1898 recodification of its crimi-
nal law. The only firearms provision was that a person under fifteen could not use firearms,
“except in the presence of his father or guardian.” An Act for the punishment of crimes (Revi-
sion of 1898), ch. 235, § 95, 1898 N.J. Laws 794, 821 (1898).
345 1927 N.J. Laws at 744–45.
346 Id. § 9, at 746.
347 Id. § 11, at 748.
348 Small Arms Act, ch. 206, § 51, 927 Laws of Haw. 209, 210–11.
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encompassed “transfer by way of sale, gift, loan or otherwise.”349 Registra-
tion was required for all firearms and all ammunition.350
Why was this unusual law enacted? Hawaii was a territory, a formerly
independent republic which had been annexed in 1898. The population was
majority non-white. Under The Insular Cases, decided two decades previ-
ously, many constitutional protections did not apply in the islands (such as
Hawaii and Puerto Rico) that the United States had acquired in the late 19th
century; according to the Court, the Bill of Rights was only meant for the
inhabitants of the contiguous mainland United States.351 Although the D.C.
Circuit in Heller II cited Hawaii laws in a litany of “longstanding” ones,352
this may not have been appropriate, given that the Hawaiian government of
the time was only partially constrained by the U.S. Constitution.
D. The 1930 Uniform Firearms Act
After the UFA was approved by the National Commissioners in 1926,
the New York City police administration led the presentation of objections at
the 1927 annual conference. So the National Commissioners withdrew the
final adoption of the 1926 text and sent it back to committee.353 After further
study, the Commissioners made some revisions and adopted a final version
in 1930.354 The committee reported its “unanimous belief” that the UFA
“should be confined entirely to the pistol.”355
The broadest restriction on firearms transfers was to prohibited persons.
“No person shall deliver a pistol” to someone under the age of 18, or to
someone the deliverer “has reasonable cause to believe” has been convicted
of a crime of violence, “or is a drug addict, an habitual drunkard, or of
unsound mind.”356
349 Id. § 9, at 211.
350 Id. §§ 18–26, at 213–17.
351 See Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197
(1903) (holding that Sixth Amendment requirement for unanimous jury not applicable in terri-
tory of Hawaii; only “fundamental” constitutional rights apply in the territories); De Lima v.
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901) (holding that Puerto Rican goods imported to the states are not
subject to the tariff applicable to foreign imports); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222
(1901) (holding that goods transported from the states to Puerto Rico were not subject to tariff
applicable to foreign imports to Puerto Rico); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901) (find-
ing that in taxing imports from Puerto Rico to the states, Congress need not obey the constitu-
tional requirement that taxes imposed by Congress be uniform throughout the United States).
352 Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
353 Charles V. Imlay, Uniform Firearms Act Reaffirmed, 16 A.B.A. J. 799, 800 (1930)
(citing 1927 Nat’l Conf. of Commissioners 866–77).
354 Report of Committee on an Act to Regulate the Sale and Possession of Firearms: Third
Draft, 1930 ANNUAL CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 530, 568–69 (1930) [here-
inafter 1930 ANNUAL CONF.].
355 Id. at 531.
356 Uniform Firearms Act § 8, at 565 (1930). Of the persons listed above, only persons
convicted of a crime of violence were forbidden to possess handguns. Id. § 4.
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The rules for handgun sales stated: “No seller shall deliver a pistol to
the purchaser thereof” without following certain conditions. This required a
forty-eight-hour waiting period, a sales form, and sending the records within
six hours to local law enforcement and the secretary of state.357 As Karl T.
Frederick explained, this gave local law enforcement time to stop the sale by
telephoning the handgun dealer, if the purchaser were a prohibited person.358
Although the language about the “seller” could be read to encompass pri-
vate sales, that was not necessarily the intended interpretation. Frederick de-
scribed the UFA as regulating sales by a “dealer.”359 None of the
commentary from the National Commissioners addresses the issue of private
sales. As discussed above, when adopting the UFA, North Dakota, Oregon,
and Indiana did want to control private sales, and so they added language
(not contained in the UFA) requiring that private handgun sales only take
place between people who know each other.360
Separately, the UFA required that a “retailer dealer” be licensed.361 In
addition to the above rules on sales, retailer dealers were subject to certain
controls on their business premises, such as not displaying handguns that are
visible to the outside.362
According to the “Explanatory Statement,” the Commissioners had
again rejected “the comparatively rare provision of a license to purchase”
and “extreme theories of regulation,” such as “state-wide registration of pis-
tols.”363 Although a handful of states had permit-to-purchase laws, “the rank
and file of the states in this country are opposed to it.”364
A new section was titled “Certain Transfers Forbidden.” It forbade
making “any loan secured by a mortgage, deposit, or pledge of a pistol; nor
shall any person lend or give a pistol to another or otherwise deliver a pistol
contrary to the provisions of this act.”365
According to the National Commissioners’ “Explanatory Statement,”
the section “prohibiting a loan of a pistol secured by any of the methods
mentioned is intended primarily to prohibit dealing in pistols by pawnbro-
kers.”366 Pawnbrokers were viewed as too often being unscrupulous about
receiving and providing stolen goods, or being otherwise indifferent to the
legality of their transactions. By forbidding persons to “lend . . . give . . . or
otherwise transfer . . . contrary to the provisions of this act,” the UFA en-
sured that pawnbrokers could not deal in pistols, no matter how the transac-
tion was structured.
357 Id. § 9, at 565.
358
FREDERICK, supra 274, at 30. R
359 Id.
360 Id.
361 Uniform Firearms Act § 10, at 565 (1930).
362 Id. § 11, at 565–66.
363 Id. at 570.
364 Imlay, supra note 353, at 800. R
365 Uniform Firearms Act § 12, at 566 (1930).
366 Id. at 573.
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While the language was “primarily” about pawnbrokers, it could have
other applications. For example, another provision of the act imposed certain
requirements on the “seller” of a handgun. A seller could not evade these
requirements by claiming that he was just lending a handgun for an indefi-
nite period, with the first three years’ rent paid in advance.
The Everytown organization argues that the above provision covers
every type of private transfer.367 This seems to be an over-reading. It ignores
the statutory language that it is unlawful to “lend . . . give . . . or otherwise
deliver” a handgun when doing so is “contrary to the provisions of this act.”
Some deliveries are necessarily lawful. For example, a package delivery
service delivers a handgun from a repair store to a customer. The delivery-
man made a “delivery.” Common sense dictates that the deliveryman is not
supposed to go through the entire process that would be mandatory if he
were selling a handgun to someone.368
The statutory language “lend . . . give . . . or otherwise deliver . . .
contrary to the provisions of this act” prevents circumvention of the other
provisions of the Uniform Firearms Act. It does not impose a new law that
people may not lend handguns to each other in the ordinary ways that they
always have—such as friends and family borrowing a gun for hunting or
target practice for several hours or days.
Requiring paperwork, mailing records to the police, and a forty-eight-
hour wait (the rules for sales) for loans would be much more burdensome
than requiring that all current handgun owners register their guns with the
police. The National Commissioners thought that such registration was “ex-
treme.”369 The Commissioners said that a license to purchase was “inconve-
nient.”370 There is no reason to suppose that the Commissioners adopted the
extreme inconvenience of making every handgun transfer be treated like a
sale.
367 Brief for Everytown for Gun Safety as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellee
and Affirmance, at 12, Colorado Outfitters Ass’n, Nos. 14-1290, 14-1292 (10th Cir. Apr. 29,
2015).
368 Cf. Strickland v. State, 72 S.E. 260 (Ga. 1911) (stating that a “narrow and literal”
construction of a statute on unlicensed gun carrying would be incorrect: “a similar construc-
tion might make it impossible for the carrier to deliver them to the dealer, or the dealer to
deliver them to the customer”). Similarly, the Texas statute against unlicensed carry did not
apply to “momentary possession of a pistol.” Davis v. State, 237 S.W. 925 (Tex. Crim. App.
1922). There are “numerous instances wherein the holding of a pistol in the hands and even
firing it with no intent to carry it have been held not within the terms of the statute.” Id. at 925
(citing nine Texas precedents); see also Rosebud v. States, 87 Tex. Crim. 267 (1920) (borrow-
ing handgun from brother, and taking it thirty miles back to bailee’s residence); State v. Under-
wood, 89 W.Va. 548 (1921) (same). Davis, Rosebud, and Underwood are cited by the National
Commissioners as part of the legal background to the Uniform Firearms Act. See 1930 AN-
NUAL CONF., supra note 354, at 543, 544. R
369 Id. at 570.
370 Id.
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E. Through 1936
Several states during this period considered to what extent they would
follow the UFA.
Pennsylvania 1931. The legislature followed the new UFA closely, ex-
cept for a broader definition of what was covered. The UFA was for hand-
guns (anything under twelve inches). The Pennsylvania statute used a special
definition of “firearm” that was a pistol or revolver with a barrel less than
twelve inches, a rifle with a barrel less than fifteen inches, or a shotgun with
a barrel less than twenty-four inches.371
These latter two would soon be covered by the National Firearms Act of
1934. Federal registration was required, supposedly for the purpose of col-
lecting the new federal tax of $5 per short gun. Short rifles and shotguns
were defined as those having barrels less than eighteen inches.372 The con-
cern was that sawed-off shotguns were often misused by criminals; if sawed
off, they were nearly as concealable and portable as a large handgun, and far
more lethal.373
Texas 1931. Texas did not follow the UFA. Rather, to purchase a hand-
gun, a person had to have been issued a “certificate of good character” from
a justice of the peace or judge.374 No one could “sell, rent, or lease” hand-
guns to minors, or to a person in the “heat of passion.”375 The law was later
declared void and unenforceable by an opinion of the Texas Attorney
General.376
District of Columbia 1932. A congressional statute for the District
partly followed the UFA for handguns, requiring the forty-eight-hour wait-
ing period, with no need for police permission.377 The purchaser had to de-
371 An Act Regulating and licensing the sale, transfer, and possession of certain firearms,
no. 158, § 1, 1931 Pa. Laws 497, 491 (1931).
372 Later reduced to sixteen inches for rifles.
373 During the first half-century of the statute, there were no reported cases related to
firearms loans. In a 1991 case in which a person had allegedly loaned a firearm to a criminal
who shot a police officer, Pennsylvania’s intermediate court of appeals held that the statute
absolutely prohibits all handgun loans—even for persons who complied with all the proce-
dures relevant to sales, such as registering the transaction with law enforcement.  Common-
wealth v. Corradino, 588 A.2d 936, 941 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991). In 1995 the Pennsylvania
legislature amended the statute to authorize loans of a “firearm” (a handgun or a short rifle or
shotgun) if the parties have concealed carry permits, for safety training, and in various other
situations. Act 1995-17, P.L. 1024, No. 17 (Spec. Sess. No. 1), § 8 (June 13, 1995) (codified at
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6115).
374 Occupation Tax on Sale of Pistols, ch. 267, § 4, 1931 Tex. Gen. Laws 447, 447–48
(May 28, 1931).
375 Id. at 447.
376 Att’y Gen. Op. WW 917 (Aug. 23, 1960), http://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/
metapth267529/m2/1/high_res_d/WW0917.pdf [http://perma.cc/E3F4-WPBC]. The opinion
was based on a recent appellate opinion holding that another provision of the 1931 statute
could not be enforced because the provision had not been expressed in the bill’s title. Doucette
v. Texas, 317 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 1958). As the Attorney General explained, the
same was true for the certificate of good character provision.
377 47 Stat. 650 (1932).
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liver the sales record to the police; all other UFA states allowed it to be
mailed.
Unlike in the UFA, there was a special definition for sales, which were
said to include “letting on hire, giving, lending, borrowing, and otherwise
transferring.”
The D.C. law also applied to “machine guns,” which were defined so
as to cover mainly firearms that are not machine guns. A D.C. “machine
gun” was any firearm that fired semi-automatically more than twelve shots
without reloading.378 This included a large number of ordinary rifles, then as
now.
For a “machine gun, sawed-off shotgun, or blackjack,” the sale could
not be consummated until the seller had received permission from the
police.379
Although the D.C. law was passed by Congress, it was not necessarily
enacted with the Second Amendment in mind. The Second Amendment re-
fers to “the security of a free State.”380 So does the Second Amendment only
apply in the fifty states, and not in the District? The D.C. Attorney General
made precisely this argument in Heller.381 Although the argument found no
support from the Supreme Court, in the D.C. Circuit, one of the three judges
on the panel found it persuasive.382 Harvard professor Laurence Tribe also
argued that the Second Amendment does not apply in the national capitol.383
More generally, congressional rule of the city, via the House and Senate
Committees on the District of Columbia, was often criticized for being high-
handed and semi-colonial. Although the District had enjoyed some self-gov-
ernment from 1820–71, as of the 1930s, District residents could not vote for
any office, including for local positions such as school board directors.384 So
it was not surprising that when Congress passed national gun legislation—
the National Firearms Act of 1934, and the Federal Firearms Act of 1938—





U.S. CONST., amend. II.
381 Brief of Petitioners, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290).
382 Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007), aff’d sub nom. District
of Columbia v. Heller (Henderson, J., dissenting).
383 Laurence H. Tribe, Sanity and the Second Amendment, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 2008, at
A16.
384 See, e.g., Editorial, D.C.—Last Colony, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 1970, at A14.
385 The NFA set up a tax and registration system for machine guns, short rifles, short
shotguns, silencers, and a few other items. National Firearms Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 474, 48
Stat. 1236. The FFA required a license to engage in interstate firearms commerce, and forbade
delivery of firearms to convicted felons. There was no requirement for government permission
for the sale of any firearm, and no restriction on particular types of firearms. Federal Firearms
Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 785, 52 Stat. 1250.
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South Dakota 1935. South Dakota closely followed the 1930 UFA.386
Unlike Pennsylvania or D.C., South Dakota did not make the statute applica-
ble to any long guns.
Washington 1935. This was nearly the same as the South Dakota law,
also for handguns only.387 In 1961, the statute was amended to add clarifying
language before the section about handgun sales: “Sales by dealers shall be
regulated as hereinafter provided.”388 This explanation ended any ambiguity
about whether the statute applied to private sales.
Licensed dealers were exempted from the prohibition of using hand-
guns to secure “a mortgage, deposit, or pledge . . . .”389 The Washington
1935 statute had ambiguous language about handgun loans “contrary to the
provisions of this act.”390 The language was removed in 1961, and replaced
by clear language simply forbidding use of handguns as security for loans.391
Alabama 1936. This law was nearly identical to South Dakota’s.392
F. Summary and Analysis
The above survey of state laws provides additional support for Heller
II’s conclusion that de minimis handgun registration, accomplished by the
dealer mailing a copy of a sales record to the government, qualifies as
“longstanding.”
Recordkeeping, waiting periods, permits to purchase, or similar con-
trols for ordinary long guns are not longstanding. Only two statutes covered
what we today would consider to be ordinary long guns: those of D.C.
(1932, for semi-automatics) and North Carolina (1919, “so-called pump
gun”). Neither of those statutes is still standing.
Three statutes covered short rifles and short shotguns: Michigan, New
Jersey, and Pennsylvania (1925, 1927, and 1931, respectively). The National
Firearms Act of 1934 adopted the idea that short rifles and short shotguns
were subject to a specially restrictive system of regulation. Nothing in the
history above supports the idea that purchase controls on long guns as a
general class are longstanding. The same is true for non-sale loans of long
guns.
For handguns, government permits to purchase were required by New
York (1911), Oregon (1913, repealed 1925), North Carolina (1919), Mis-
souri (1921, repealed 2007), Connecticut (1923), Michigan (1927, partially
repealed by several steps in early twenty-first century), Hawaii (1927), New
386 Adopting Uniform Firearms Act, ch. 208, § 9, 1935 S.D. Sess. Laws 355, 356.
387 Short Firearms, ch. 172, § 9, 1935 Wash. Sess. Laws 599, 601–02.
388 Act of Mar. 16, 1961, ch. 124 § 7, 1961 Wash. Sess. Laws 1638, 1641.
389 § 12, 1935 Wash. Sess. Laws at 603.
390 Id.
391 § 9, 1961 Wash. Sess. Laws at 1642.
392 Act of Apr. 6, 1936, no. 82, 1936 Ala. Laws 51 (extra session). In 2015, Alabama law
was amended to eliminate handgun registration. ALA. CODE § 13A-11-79 (2015).
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Jersey (1927), and Texas (1931, later declared void). This amounts to six
still-standing state laws that have been in effect for at least eighty-eight
years.
North Dakota (1923), Oregon (1925), and Indiana (1925) did not adopt
any permit-to-purchase system, but they did require that private sellers and
buyers know each other personally.
For loans of handguns, a requirement for advance government permis-
sion appeared only in Missouri (1921, later repealed), Michigan (1927, later
reformed), and in the Territory of Hawaii (1927). No provision anywhere
required that loans could only be transacted via both parties going to a gun
store.
The most repressive laws were usually enacted in places where the leg-
islature could sincerely consider itself unconstrained by any right of citizens
to keep and bear arms. The Second Amendment did not apply in Hawaii, and
its application in the District of Columbia was at least questionable. As for
the states, according to the 1886 Supreme Court decision in Presser v. Illi-
nois, the Second Amendment did not directly apply to the states, and did not
apply to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities
Clause.393 Although many state constitutions had a right to arms provision,
there was no such provision, as of 1936, in New York or New Jersey.394
In retrospect, the UFA was successful at its primary objective: prevent-
ing the spread of New York-style permit-to-purchase laws. The UFA propo-
sal for enhanced penalties for use of a firearm in a violent crime was adopted
everywhere. The UFA model of statewide preemption of local firearms laws
also proved popular. Today, the majority of states preempt all local gun con-
trols; every state except Hawaii preempts some types of local controls.
The UFA placed no limits on open carrying of firearms, while the 1930
version set up a discretionary licensing system for concealed carry. The dis-
cretionary system did not work well in practice; carry permits were often
given to political cronies, celebrities, and the like, but were denied to people
in greatest need, such as crime witnesses who were receiving death threats.
The modern movement towards objective licensing began with Washington
State in 1961.395 Today, the large majority of states have objective systems
for concealed carry licensing.
The state laws based on the final, 1930 version of the UFA, are less
than eighty-five years old, and are too recent to be “longstanding.” The
1920s laws based on the Revolver Association Act are a closer case, but the
better argument is that they are not “longstanding” either—especially for
the provisions that have no nineteenth-century predecessors.
393 See generally Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
394 Nor in California, although its laws for the period were not so aberrant as New York or
New Jersey.
395 § 6, 1961 Wash. Sess. Laws at 1640–41.
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Justice Breyer’s dissent in Heller criticized the majority’s list of “long-
standing” gun controls that were “presumptively constitutional,” since none
of them had colonial analogues.396 The majority replied:
Justice Breyer chides us . . . for not providing extensive his-
torical justification for those regulations of the right that we de-
scribe as permissible . . . . But since this case represents this
Court’s first in-depth examination of the Second Amendment, one
should not expect it to clarify the entire field, any more than Reyn-
olds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879), our first in-depth Free
Exercise Clause case, left that area in a state of utter certainty. And
there will be time enough to expound upon the historical justifica-
tions for the exceptions we have mentioned if and when those ex-
ceptions come before us.397
If we say that the UFA is “longstanding,” the problem remains that the
large majority of states in the 1920s and 1930s did not adopt the UFA, nor
did they adopt the less-favored New York model. The typical state gun laws
of the 1920s and 1930s were less restrictive than either the UFA or the New
York model.
Supreme Court statements about legal history are not infallible. The
“longstanding” approach is not needed to support laws against gun posses-
sion by convicted felons. Such a statute has been upheld in Missouri, where
a recent state constitutional amendment required judicial strict scrutiny for
nearly all forms of gun control.398 The other items in the Supreme Court’s list
of permissible controls can also be tested under heightened scrutiny and
would probably pass, especially if the particular statute in question were
carefully tailored.
VII. FIXING THE PROBLEMS
As described in Part III, the Bloomberg laws impose severe burdens on
ordinary firearms activities. Many of these burdens fall on persons who are
not privately selling firearms. The burdens fall on the sheriff’s deputy who is
returning a gun to a victim of an auto accident, on firearms safety instructors
and their students, on museums, and on persons who loan firearms for a few
moments or a few days to family members and friends. All of these
problems could easily be avoided, if the objective of the Bloomberg laws
were to require background checks on the private sale of firearms, rather
than to damage lawful firearms activities.
396 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 721 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
397 Id. at 635.
398 See State v. Merritt, No. SC 94096, 2015 WL 4929765 (Mo. Aug. 18, 2015).
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A. Exempt Loans and Returns
Rather than applying only to the private sales of firearms, the Bloom-
berg laws apply to all “transfers,” expansively defined to include loans and
returns. The simplest solution would be to revise the wording of the laws so
that they apply only to sales and other permanent dispositions.
The objection can be raised that a rule about temporary transfers is nec-
essary to avoid sham transactions; e.g., “I will lease you this handgun for the
next 30 years for $500.” Addressing sham transactions does not require that
a state criminalize letting a friend hold one’s gun while you are both on your
own property, nor does it require prohibiting loaning a hunting rifle to a
friend for a week.
In Colorado, the Bloomberg proposal was amended to exempt all tem-
porary transfers of less than seventy-two hours.399 This at least helps with
firearms safety classes. In California, persons who know each other may
loan firearms for up to thirty days.400 Further, Californians may loan hunting
rifles and shotguns for the “duration of the hunting season for which the
firearm is to be used.”401 To pass the Bloomberg law in Delaware, propo-
nents allowed fourteen-day loans between persons who personally know
each other.402 These exemptions solve some but not all of the problems. The
seventy-two-hour exemption is helpful for firearms safety classes, but not
for stalking victims. As detailed in Part III, even a thirty-day exemption
discourages the safe storage of firearms with family or friends when a per-
son will be away from home for an extended period.
The Bloomberg requirement that the return of a loaned firearm must
undergo the same process as the sale of a firearm makes no sense at all. It
has no possible connection to avoiding sham transactions. It imposes a
pointless burden on law-abiding gun owners and should be eliminated.
B. Exempt Persons Who Have Already Passed a Background Check
All fifty states and the District of Columbia issue permits to carry a
concealed handgun. The permitting process is much more extensive than that
involved for buying a firearm in a store. Both the retail purchase and the
carry permit involve checks on databases that list persons who are prohibited
from owning firearms. Typically, the carry permit system has additional re-
quirements: biometric identity verification, such as fingerprint cards which
are sent to the FBI and its state counterpart; a requirement that the applicant
provide proof of safety training; and some discretion by the permitting
agency to deny an applicant who may have a clean record, but who is known
399
COLO. REV. STATS. § 18-12-112(6)(h) (2013).
400
CAL. PENAL CODE § 27880 (2014).
401
CAL. PENAL CODE § 27950 (2012).
402
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1448B(b)(2) (2013).
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to be unsuitable to carry a handgun. Thus, twenty-two states exempt retail
sales from background checks if the buyer has a carry permit.403 As dis-
cussed above, exemptions for persons with carry permits are nearly as old as
the idea of regulating handgun sales, with Massachusetts leading the way
with its 1926 statute.404
One objection to exempting persons with carry permits is that the per-
son might become a prohibited person during the term of the permit (which
is usually three to five years). The objection ignores the fact that permitting
agencies revoke the permits of persons who have become prohibited.405
C. Do Not Require Dealer Processing
To accomplish background checks, there is no need to require that par-
ticipants in a private sale (or a loan and return) must travel to a gun store.
First of all, law enforcement agencies conduct background checks all the
time. Some or many law enforcement agencies would be willing to conduct
such checks as a community service, or for a nominal fee to cover their
costs. As long as law enforcement agencies were not required to keep exten-
sive records and forms, these costs would likely be minimal.
More generally, law enforcement ought to be entirely exempted from
the Bloomberg laws. Some law enforcement transfers of firearms, such as
giving an agency firearm to an officer, involve recipients who have already
passed background checks in order to be hired by law enforcement. Other
transfers, such as to a technician at a regional forensic laboratory, may not
involve recipients who have passed the background check to become a certi-
fied law enforcement officer, but there is very little risk that recipients em-
ployed by law enforcement agencies will use the gun to commit a crime.
As for returning lost, stolen, or temporary custody firearms to their
rightful owners, law enforcement agencies should be allowed to use their
discretion. If the agency prefers that the owner be background-checked
before receiving her own gun back, the agency ought to be able to conduct
the check itself—rather than having to send an officer and the owner to a
gun store.
Nor is there any need for sales between ordinary private citizens to be
consummated at a gun store. Using telephones or the Internet, private citi-
zens ought to be able to contact the appropriate state agency directly for a
403 Permanent Brady Permit Chart, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, & FIREARMS OFFICE
OF ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS AND SERVS., https://www.atf.gov/content/firearms/firearms-
industry/permanent-brady-permit-chart [http://perma.cc/FDV6-5RF3] (last updated June 10,
2014).
404 See supra Part VI.C.
405 See, e.g., Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2013) (explaining the strin-
gency of the Colorado process for issuance of the license, and the “state flagging system” to
revoke licenses of persons who are arrested).
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background check on a firearms buyer. Indeed, Massachusetts and Connecti-
cut already have telephone/online systems for some private sales.406
Following the Supreme Court’s example in Heller, courts have often
relied on First Amendment analogies to decide Second Amendment cases.
The most apt analogy for the Bloomberg laws comes from the Supreme
Court’s 2014 decision in McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission.407
The Court held that laws which capped how much a person could donate to
federal election campaigns, by donating the maximum allowed amount to
multiple candidates, violated the First Amendment.
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court explained:
Based on what we can discern from experience, the indiscriminate
ban on all contributions above the aggregate limits is dispropor-
tionate to the Government’s interest in preventing circumvention.
The Government has not given us any reason to believe that par-
ties or candidates would dramatically shift their priorities if the
aggregate limits were lifted. Absent such a showing, we cannot
conclude that the sweeping aggregate limits are appropriately tai-
lored to guard against any contributions that might implicate the
Government’s anticircumvention interest.
A final point: It is worth keeping in mind that the base limits
themselves are a prophylactic measure. As we have explained,
“restrictions on direct contributions are preventative, because few
if any contributions to candidates will involve quid pro quo ar-
rangements.” . . . The aggregate limits are then layered on top,
ostensibly to prevent circumvention of the base limits. This “pro-
phylaxis-upon-prophylaxis approach” requires that we be particu-
larly diligent in scrutinizing the law’s fit. . . .
Importantly, there are multiple alternatives available to Con-
gress that would serve the Government’s anticircumvention inter-
est, while avoiding “unnecessary abridgment” of First
Amendment rights.408
The McCutcheon analogy to the Bloomberg laws is straightforward:
there is a government interest in preventing something (quid-pro-quo politi-
cal corruption; violent gun crime). So there is a prophylactic measure (a cap
406
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, §§ 128A, 131E (2015) (making this process available for
long guns, and for handguns if the purchaser has a carry permit); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-
33(c), 29-36.l, 29-37a(e) (2013); cf. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140 § 121 (2015) (specifying that
“firearm” means handguns, but not long guns, other than short rifles and short shotguns).
Procedures can be adopted to avoid potential abuse of the system, such as a father calling in a
background check on his daughter’s boyfriend, by claiming to be selling the boyfriend a gun.
Use of the system for anything other than a background check on gun sales should be a crimi-
nal offense, and should also be a civil offense, so that the subject of an improper check can
recover statutory damages and attorney’s fees.
407 See generally McCutcheon v. Federal Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
408 Id. at 1458.
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on donations to individual candidates; a prohibition on gun possession by
certain persons). Then there is a second prophylaxis to enforce the first pro-
phylaxis (mandatory reporting of campaign contributions; background
checks on gun buyers). But by the time we get to prophylaxis upon prophy-
laxis upon prophylaxis (the aggregate limit on donations to multiple candi-
dates), the law has become disproportionately burdensome and excessively
distant from the government interest at hand. When a law requires that fire-
arms loans, and the return of loaned firearms, may only take place at gun
stores, and must be processed as if they were firearms purchases, the law is
prophylaxis for its own sake, far distant from any legitimate government
interest and far too burdensome on the ordinary exercise of Second Amend-
ment rights.
VIII. CONCLUSION
As detailed in Part III, the Bloomberg laws severely burden the core of
the Second Amendment right. “One cannot exercise the right to keep and
bear arms without actually possessing a firearm.”409 Requiring two trips to a
gun store for the loan and return of a firearm is a further burden.410 In histori-
cal perspective—presented in Parts V and VI—the Bloomberg laws are ex-
treme outliers in the tradition of American gun control; their historical
analogues are the limitations on arms acquisitions by free blacks and by
slaves, and these restrictions were abolished by the Fourteenth Amendment
and related congressional statutes. For the reasons discussed in Part VII, the
Bloomberg laws are unnecessarily oppressive. There is no reason to require
that firearms loans of a few minutes or several days, between people who
know each other, must be treated as if they were firearms sales. There is no
reason to require that the return of a loaned firearm be treated like a firearms
sale. There is no reason to require trips to a gun store and extensive
paperwork for the ostensible purpose of conducting a background check on
someone who, by being issued a concealed carry permit, has already passed
a much more stringent background check than the store can offer. There is
no reason to require anyone to travel to gun stores for background checks
when such checks can be accomplished by telephone or the Internet.
The Bloomberg laws criminalize the common activities of the vast ma-
jority of law-abiding gun owners, including the large majority of them who
will never sell a firearm in their lives. The most charitable explanation of
this massive criminalization would be drafting ineptitude. When drafters are
unfamiliar with an activity and dislike it, unintended collateral damage can
409 Silvester v. Harris, 41 F. Supp. 3d, 927, 962 (E.D. Cal. 2014); see also Ezell v. City of
Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 704 (7th Cir. 2011) (regarding the right to acquire firearms).
410 Cf. Silvester, 41 F. Supp. 3d at 944 (“The multiple trips required to complete a transac-
tion can cause disruptions in work and personal schedules, extra fuel expense, and wear and
tear on a car depending upon where a firearm or a firearms dealer is located in relation to the
purchaser.”).
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be an expected result; if one hired Marxist-Leninists to draft banking regula-
tions, some of the resulting harms to ordinary banking activities might not
be intended. Yet even the 2015 version of the Bloomberg proposal, drafted
for a generally “pro-gun” electorate, retains many of the problems that have
been previously pointed out—most egregiously, making it nearly impossible
to loan a firearm for lawful self-defense in an emergency.
In the Heller litigation, Mr. Bloomberg filed an amicus brief arguing
the Second Amendment does not pertain to ordinary Americans.411 Pough-
keepsie, New York, Mayor John Tkazyik quit Mr. Bloomberg’s organization
because he said that he had realized that the organization’s agenda was not
keeping guns away from criminals, but “to promote confiscation of guns
from law-abiding citizens.”412 Whatever Mr. Bloomberg’s motives or objec-
tives, examination of the Bloomberg laws supports the statement of the
Washington State Law Enforcement Firearms Instructors Association that
the laws “make criminals of all recreational shooters and most law enforce-
ment officers.” They “criminalize . . . good citizens” by transforming “cas-
ual, innocent, ordinary, non-criminal behavior into a misdemeanor or
felony.”413
The Bloomberg laws are not laws that simply require background
checks for the private sale of firearms. Instead, the laws’ unusual definition
of a firearms “transfer” imposes severe restrictions on temporary firearms
loans and the return of loaned firearms. These restrictions severely damage
safety training, safe storage, law enforcement, museum displays, lawful self-
defense, and other responsible firearms activities. Persons who favor back-
ground checks on private sales and who believe that there can be a harmoni-
ous synthesis of responsible gun rights and reasonable gun control should
reject the Bloomberg system, and instead consider less restrictive, more ef-
fective alternatives.
411 Brief of Major American Cities, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, at 1, 18
n.3, 19, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290), 2008 WL 157195 at
*1 (“Amici cities are: . . . New York City, New York.”); id. at *18 (“[T]he Second Amend-
ment was not intended to vest armed power in citizens acting outside of any governmental
military effort [nor] to protect the right to possess guns for self defense and hunting.”); see
also Brief of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Defen-
dant-Appellee District of Columbia and Affirmance of the Decision Below at 2, Parker v.
District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (No. 04-7041), 2006 WL 5846068, at *i
(“Michael R. Bloomberg, Mayor, City of New York, by its Attorney Michael A. Cardozo,
Corporation Counsel.”); id. at *2 (“Appellants and their amici are simply wrong that the Sec-
ond Amendment provides an individual right to bear arms.”).
412 John Tkazyik, Valley View: Mayoral group’s gun agenda is wrong, POUGHKEEPSIE J.,
(Feb. 5, 2014), http://archive.poughkeepsiejournal.com/article/20140205/OPINION04/302050
008/Valley-View-Mayoral-group-s-gun-agenda-wrong [http://perma.cc/WD4W-FE32] (noting
that nearly fifty other mayors have left the Bloomberg organization Mayors Against Illegal
Guns for similar reasons).
413 Shave, supra note 126. R
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